From
March 1986 through October 21, 1986, the Reagan Administration
implemented a series of national security policy decisions designed to
reduce the threat of espionage in the United States from the Soviet
Union. These decisions resulted in the first mass expulsion of foreign
intelligence officers in US history. Eighty Soviet national (KGB) and
military (GRU) intelligence officers, assigned under diplomatic cover in
New York, San Francisco and Washington, were ordered to leave the United
States between September and October 1986. These expulsions had a
devastating impact on the Soviet espionage capabilities in the US, and
may have been the single most important set of national security
decisions made to decrease the intelligence threat since the passage of
the National Security Act of 1947. This series of decisions was to
become known by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) code name,
�Operation Famish.�
Operation
�Famish�
The
Integration of Counterintelligence into the
National
Strategic Decisionmaking Process
By
CI Centre Professor David G. Major
(This
unclassified paper was originally
published in Spring 1995 in the Defense Intelligence Journal.
David Major
helped formulate the
policies and programs
involved in Operation "Famish" while he was the Director of
Counterintelligence Programs at the National Security Council. Major
presents a segment on Operation "Famish" in the CI Centre
courses, "502:
Key Counterintelligence Events"
and "505:
National Security Counterintelligence Policy Formulation: A Study of
Congressional and White House Conflict and Cooperation")
"Our
children are dear to us, our wives are dear to us, so are our
parents, our kinsmen, our friends and acquaintances. But our
country contains within it all these objects of endearment, and
preserves them to us; and therefore every good man should be ready
to lay down his life for it, if he can thus do it service."
Thus
wrote Francis Hutchenson in the 18th century textbook, A Short
Introduction to Moral Philosophy, used to study morals and politics
in nearly all American colleges during the colonial period of our
history. Hutchenson and others of his period had a profound influence on
the founding of the United States. They laid the groundwork for the
American constitution by questioning the �divine right of kings� and
recognizing that civil power and authority are the only means to assure
the well being of the public -- us, and those dear to us. They thought
deeply about the public trust and the duties of civil office. Hutchenson
argued that the obligations of faithful fulfillment of the public trust
by those who hold civil power are �very high and sacred.�
Thus,
the obligations of civil servants are sacred, including the duty of
fidelity to the trust they hold, because the rights of the public are
divine.
Hutchenson
and our founding fathers were not claiming that public officials must
always be right in deciding what course to follow in defense of the
public interest. Rather, they insisted that officials must not betray
the public trust. They did not argue for infallibility, but for
incorruptibility -- the absolute refusal to betray or even to risk the
public interest for the sake of some personal gain, whether wealth,
power, prestige or whatever else might be desirable.
Hutchenson
argued that for a public servant�s crimes against public rights, gross
abuses of power or attempts to increase his or her own power or
influence, there should be no impunity. �But our country contains
within it all these objects of endearment, and preserves them to us.�
This explains the rationale for patriotism, the preeminent importance of
the �public trust� placed in public officials. It is, thus, the
mandate for a comprehensively designed and executed national
counterintelligence (CI) strategy.
Notwithstanding
that importance, CI remains one of the thinnest disciplines in the
national security community. It is seldom it discussed, much less
taught, in programs on government, public policy, international
relations or history by our institutions of higher education. Thus, we
expose our future leaders to �happy history.� That is, history that
ignores the strategic importance of CI successes and failures. As a
result, most military, political, government and academic professionals
have only an episodic understanding of the importance of CI and the need
to maintain a dynamic national CI program.
From
March 1986 through October 21, 1986, the Reagan Administration
implemented a series of national security policy decisions designed to
reduce the threat of espionage in the United States from the Soviet
Union. These decisions resulted in the first mass expulsion of foreign
intelligence officers in US history. Eighty Soviet national (KGB) and
military (GRU) intelligence officers, assigned under diplomatic cover in
New York, San Francisco and Washington, were ordered to leave the United
States between September and October 1986. These expulsions had a
devastating impact on the Soviet espionage capabilities in the US, and
may have been the single most important set of national security
decisions made to decrease the intelligence threat since the passage of
the National Security Act of 1947. This series of decisions was to
become known by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) code name,
�Operation Famish.�
On
October 23, 1986, the lead editorial in the Washington Post
stated that:
"...over
the years successive American Administrations allowed the Kremlin to
build up an immense espionage presence in the United States. Each
time the matter came up in the American Government, the
determination was that there wasn�t very much to do about it. The
spy presence became a fact, part of the furniture in the room of
Soviet-American relations. But it was always wrong, and President
Reagan was right finally to do something about it. The route by
which he arrived at this decision seems a bit obscure, but two broad
considerations are evident. He made clear to the Soviets that he was
serious and that their effort to keep expulsions within the familiar
and ostensibly fair tit-for-tat context was no longer acceptable,
since it gives a permanent and demonstrable unfair advantage to the
side that most loads up its diplomatic billets with spies. And he
waited for an opportune moment when the Soviets had been drawn into
negotiations on other matters that hold out promise to them." 1
These
expulsions are considered a high water mark by the US CI community
because of the impact they had on the espionage threat to the United
States. As the Washington Post editorial indicated, however, the
public understanding of how and why this national security policy
decision was made appears obscure. This article is an examination of the
interagency structure and process through which these decisions were
made. It highlights the force of personalities, in key positions during
a crucial and opportune period, that allowed these decisions to be
considered and subsequently made. Given the same set of circumstances
with different individuals in these key positions, it is doubtful that
the same government actions could have been taken. This is clearly
illustrated through the �Famish� decisions.
The
Context
From
1966 through 1974, there were no federal indictments or prosecutions for
espionage. As a result, there was little public understanding or
congressional interest in the threat posed by foreign intelligence to US
national security interests. Consequently, the espionage threat was not
routinely viewed as a strategic national security issue that required
Presidential attention. Nor were the CI implications of foreign policy
and defense decisions routinely integrated into the decisionmaking
process. Rather, espionage and our CI response were issues of concern to
only a few experts within the FBI, CIA and CI elements of the military
Services.
Then,
between 1975 and 1989, 72 individuals were indicted and successfully
prosecuted for espionage.2 Most notably, on March 19, 1985
John Walker, a retired US Navy Warrant Officer, was arrested by the FBI
following an attempted clandestine exchange of classified defense
information with a Soviet KGB officer.
Due to
the publicity given to this case, there was a growing awareness of the
hostile intelligence threat. A sequence of government studies was
commissioned. These studies played an instrumental role in the events
leading up to the mass expulsion of the Soviet intelligence officers in
1986.
In
direct response to the Walker arrests, Secretary of Defense Casper W.
Weinberger established the Department of Defense (DoD) Security Review
Commission. The Commission was directed to �conduct a review and
evaluation of DoD security polices and procedures� and �identify any
systemic vulnerabilities or weaknesses in DoD security programs and make
recommendations for change.� 3 In discussing the impact of
espionage on US defense and defense decisionmaking, the report concluded
that:
Protecting
a nation�s defense secrets from compromise is an age-old
challenge. However, the stakes for the United States have never been
higher. Given the extraordinary importance of advanced technology to
our nation�s military capabilities, its loss to a potential
adversary -- by espionage, theft or other unauthorized disclosure --
can be crucial to the military balance.4
Shortly
before this, at the beginning of the second session of the 99th Congress
in 1985, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) had
initiated a comprehensive review of the capabilities of US CI and
security programs for dealing with the threat from Soviet espionage and
other hostile intelligence activities. The SSCI had just begun its work
when John Walker was arrested and other members of the Walker network
were identified and arrested.
Walker�s
arrest precipitated a series of closed SSCI hearings with US
intelligence agencies during the fall of 1985. As a result of these
hearings, the SSCI published an unclassified report. The SSCI concluded
that the aggregate damage from hostile intelligence was far greater than
anyone in the US government had acknowledged publicly. It advised the
national policymakers to recognize the gravity of damage to national
security interests caused by hostile intelligence operations. US
military plans and capabilities had been seriously compromised,
involving billions of dollars of actual and potential damage to US
military programs.5
Thus,
Congressional interest in the hostile intelligence threat to national
security was active by the middle of the 19805. The executive branch had
begun to focus on the problem in the mid-1970s.
The
Evolution of the Interagency Structure
By
1978, President Carter had issued Executive Order (EO) 12076, setting
forth the roles of the Intelligence Community (IC) agencies. Within this
EO was a requirement directing the annual preparation of a
multidisciplinary assessment of the hostile intelligence threat to the
United States.6 This annual assessment, based on all
intelligence collection sources, began to be produced in 1979 and was
publicized every year through the end of the 1980s. In each report,
recommendations for improvement were included and, by 1985, over 400
recommendations had been set forth in the reports. However, as of 1985,
essentially none of those recommendations had been implemented.7
Soon
after taking office in 1980, President Ronald Reagan directed a review
of the IC and issued EO 12333. That EO set forth the goals, direction,
duties and responsibilities of the national intelligence effort and
directed that �special emphasis should be given to detecting and
countering espionage and other threats and activities directed by
foreign intelligence services against the United States government or US
corporations, establishments or persons.� 8
The
mechanism to formulate CI and security policy in the administration was
established on 13 January 1982, when President Reagan issued National
Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-2. This NSDD directed the formation
of the Senior Interagency Group for Intelligence (SIG-I). The Director
of Central Intelligence (DCI) was appointed by the President as the
chairman of the SIG-I. Among his duties as chair of the SIG-I was the
responsibility to develop standards and doctrine for CI activities and
to resolve interagency differences concerning the implementation of CI
policy. In February 1982, DCI William Casey signed SIG-I Directive
Number 1 creating two subordinate organizations to deal with the foreign
intelligence threat: the Interagency Group/Counterintelligence (IG/CI),
chaired by the Director of the FBI, and the Interagency
Group/Countermeasures (IG/CM), chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Policy.
On 19
February 1982, President Reagan issued National Security Study Directive
(NSSD)-2. This NSSD, initiated by the Intelligence Directorate of the
National Security Council (NSC/ID) called for an urgent and
comprehensive review of the objectives, policies, organization,
capabilities, resource priorities and vulnerabilities of the efforts of
the US government to detect and counter the foreign intelligence threat
in its totality.9 In response to this tasking, the IG/CI and
IG/CM formed working groups to research and report on the matter. Four
interagency coordinated reports were produced between July 1982 and June
1983. These dealt with US capabilities against hostile intelligence,
counterintelligence and countermeasures, organizational studies and
counterintelligence databases. However, by November 1983, no
recommendations had been forwarded by the SIG/I to the NSC staff for
review or action.
The
Role of the NSC Staff
In
1983, the NSC/ID had responsibility for dealing with all intelligence
policy issues presented to the White House for Presidential review. It
consisted of three professional staff officers. In November 1983, Judge
William Clark, who was then the Assistant to the President for National
Security (APNSA), asked the NSC/ID to advise him of the three biggest
problems in dealing with the hostile intelligence threat. The NSC/ID
representatives attended SIG/I, IG/CI and IG/CM meetings and were aware
that there was not common agreement on any of the many recommendations
to enhance the national CI or security countermeasures programs. In
fact, every recommendation was opposed by one or more members of the
working groups.
Nevertheless,
a key finding during the various reviews, and one that was repeatedly
set forth in the annual multidisciplinary hostile intelligence threat
assessments, was the size of the hostile intelligence presence in the
United States and the inadequate FBI resources to deal with the size of
the threat. Thus, in response to Judge Clark�s request, the NSC/ID
highlighted that problem. As recognized in 1983, despite the development
of increasingly sophisticated technical collection means, the human
agent involved in espionage against the United States continued to be
the source of the most damage to national security.
At that
time, there were about 2,100 diplomatic and commercial officials in the
US from the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries. In New
York, the Soviet Union had the largest diplomatic representation to the
United Nations 275 officials with diplomatic status. In addition, the UN
hired another 300 Soviet nationals to work in New York as international
civil servants. According to the public record issued by the SSCI,
approximately 25 percent were considered KGB or GRU intelligence
officers. In addition, the Soviet Union had about 320 diplomatic
officials at its Embassy in Washington and, with the additional support
staff of working wives and Soviets involved in support functions, the
number of Soviet nationals attached to the Embassy was around 550
persons. The FBI estimated that about 30 percent of the Soviet diplomats
in their diplomatic establishments in Washington, New York and San
Francisco were KGB or GRU intelligence officers.10
Each
year the FBI had advised Congress that, even with enhancements, the FBI
could not cope with the hostile intelligence presence in the United
States unless measures were taken to reduce the number of potential
intelligence officers in this country. A key assumption of most US
government officials at that time was reflected by the statement of the
SSCI: �Where the numbers cannot be reduced, control of their movements
can assist the FBI making better use of limited resources.�11
The IG/CI reports also consistently repeated this finding, but no
actions were taken to deal with the situation. The problem boiled down
to one of too many Communist intelligence officers in the US, the
accepted position that the government could do nothing about it,
compounded by the FBI not having enough resources to deal with the
problem. Key policy decisions aimed at dealing with this problem
culminated in the mass expulsion in October 1986.
The
First Steps
As a
first step, Judge Clark concluded that the Administration had to make a
policy point concerning the importance of dealing with the foreign
intelligence threat. Thus, he and the NSC/ID staff briefed President
Reagan on the espionage threat. As a result, President signed a
directive to increase the size of the FBI�s budget to increase its
Special Agent personnel and to handle its CI responsibilities.
This
increase was the first step to deal with half of the problem of �being
outgunned� by the hostile foreign intelligence officers in the US.
This, however, still left the Administration with an expanding Soviet
intelligence presence and no agreement on how to reduce it.
From
1983 through 1985, the IG/CI made numerous recommendations to enhance
CI. These were subsequently reduced to a handful by the SIG/I. For a
variety of reasons, none of these recommendations were forwarded to the
NSC staff for Presidential review.
By
1984, a majority of Congressional members had become frustrated over the
lack of parity in staffing Soviet and US Embassies and Consulates and
the Administration�s inaction on that issue. Accordingly, Congress
passed the Leahy-Huddleston Amendment of 1984, which required a report
to Congress on the respective numbers and treatment of officials from
countries that conduct intelligence activities in the United States. The
Amendment also addressed the numbers and treatment of US officials in
countries engaged in espionage activities against the US. This was
followed, in 1985, by the Leahy-Cohen Amendment, directing equivalence
in the staffing of Soviet and US Embassies and Consulates.12
In
1985, the Soviet Union employed over 500 Soviet nationals in their
Embassy in Washington, with 320 personnel having diplomatic status. No
US nationals were employed by the Soviet Embassy in Washington. At the
same time, the US had 251 US diplomatic officials in the US Embassy in
Moscow and hired 260 Soviet nationals to provide support.
The
First Decision is Made
By
August 1985, the NSC/ID staff had been expanded to four staff officers,
including for the first time an FBI Supervisory Special Agent. Because
of the Walker espionage arrest and publicity in May 1985, by late July
1985 the SIG/I recommendations to enhance CI were finally forwarded to
the NSC/ID Staff, in anticipation of Presidential review at a NSC
meeting.
At the
time, while the number of FBI personnel was increasing, the number of
Soviet intelligence officers had not been reduced. There were many
factors, but the large Soviet intelligence presence in the US was one
that allowed the Walker espionage ring to go undetected since 1968. The
key political problem was that agreement could not be reached to
implement any of the recommendations for change. Each recommendation was
opposed on the basis that it would have a negative impact on one or more
US agencies� perceived ability to perform their missions. For example,
the State Department believed that any action would have a negative
impact on US foreign relations with the Soviets. The CIA opposed any
recommendation to reduce the number of Soviets in the US since, in their
view, it was essential that the CIA maintain a collection capability in
Moscow. CIA numbers in Moscow were too small to allow for any
significant number of expulsions that might occur in retaliation for US
reductions of Soviet agents in the US. Thus, it was easier to do
nothing.
However,
by summer 1985, some in Congress had begun to call for a Blue Ribbon
Panel to examine what was wrong with US CI and security since so many
spies were being arrested. If the Administration chose not to take any
action, Congress could impanel a commission and might pass legislation
to address the problem.
At the
subsequent NSC meeting of all the SIG/I recommendations were unanimously
endorsed and sent to the Preside for approval. The NSC/ID was directed
to prepare an NSDD to implement all the recommendations.
The key
decision made at this meeting was to eliminate the disparity in the
US-USSR representation by mid-1988. The Soviet official presence in the
US was to be reduced and the US presence in Moscow was to be increased.
The method to achieve this goal was left to the State Department, with
the plan to be reviewed by the NSC.
The US
would seek Soviet agreement to in this plan but, notwithstanding, would
unilaterally replace Soviet nationals in the US Embassy in Moscow and
Leningrad and prevent the arrival of Soviet support personnel in the US
to staff their diplomatic establishments until parity was achieved.
Just
before the President signed this NSDD, two key event took place that
were to playa key role in providing the environment for action. The
first was unknown at the time; the second was highly publicized.
On
April 16, 1985, Aldridge H. Ames, a CIA Intelligence Officer assigned as
the counterintelligence referent responsible for monitoring recruitment
of Soviet officials, walked into the Soviet Embassy in Washington and
handed an envelope to the duty officer at the reception desk. The
envelope was addressed to the KGB Rezident and contained a note which
described two or three CIA cases involving Soviets who had approached
the CIA to offer their services. So started nine years of espionage
directed against the US that lasted until Ames was arrested on February
21, 1994. On June 13, 1985, Ames provided the KGB with copies of
documents that identified over ten top-level CIA and FBI sources who
were reporting on Soviet activities.13
On
August 1, 1985, Vitaliy Yurchenko a full Colonel in the KGB, defected to
the CIA in Rome. He identified a former CIA officer, Edward Lee Howard,
as a KGB agent. Howard had been trained for assignment to Moscow and,
just prior to his dispatch, had been given a polygraph examination.
During this examination he admitted to recent theft and drug use. As a
result, the CIA had fired him. Based on Yurchenko�s revelation, the
FBI initiated an investigation of Howard in August 1985 and he was
interviewed in late September 1985. Prior to this investigation being
initiated by the FBI, however, Howard had traveled to Vienna, Austria in
early August 1985 where he had been warned by the KGB that he might be
at risk because one of their intelligence officers had defected. Thus,
during his FBI interview, Howard did not admit his espionage activity
but, following the interview, fled to the Soviet Union with intimate
knowledge of CIA clandestine operations and personnel in Moscow.
In
November 1985, President Reagan signed NSDD-196, directing that the 12
SIG/I recommendations be implemented and the NSC, Staff chair .a task
force to develop timetables, procedures and methods to Implement the
NSDD.14
Key
Decisions Begin to be Implemented
In
furtherance of that goal, the State Department advised the NSC/ID--that
the 1947 United Nations Headquarters Agreement grants the host nation --
the US in this case -- the right to take action against UN member
representation if it presents a national security concern. The NSDD 196
Implementing Task Force agreed that the reduction of the Soviet presence
in New York would be more helpful to the national CI program than
reducing the Soviet presence in Washington. No agreement could be
reached on replacing the Soviet nationals working in the US Embassy in
Moscow. The State Department began to explore the cost and availability
of obtaining contractor support for this function.
A plan
was prepared by the Task Force, approved by the President and NSC
principals in January to reduce the Soviet presence in New York from 275
to 170 while leaving the numbers in Washington constant. The State
Department requested that the Soviets not be advised of this decision
until after the 25th Communist Party Congress to be held in Moscow in
February 1986.
In
March 1986, the US Ambassador to the UN, Vernon Walters advised the
Soviet UN Ambassador Alexander M. Belogonov, that the Russian.
Byelorussian and Ukrainian Missions must be reduced in four stages,
beginning with 25 individuals on October 1, 1986. This was to be
followed by an additional 25 in April 1987, 25 in October 1987 and a
final 30 in April 1988. That would still leave the Soviet Mission with
the largest representation in the UN. The 300 Soviet nationals working
for the UN Secretariat would not be affected, but these individuals had
no diplomatic protection from espionage prosecution. The Soviets were
advised that they could decide which personnel would depart and that
this reduction could be accomplished by attrition as long as they kept
to the schedule.
The
initial reaction of Ambassador Belogonov was to protest and to state
publicly that the Soviet Union would appeal to the World Court. By April
1986, the nuclear disaster occurred at Chernobyl and no further
discussion occurred relating to this response.15
Another
key event also occurred in April 1986. The CIA changed its position and
said that it would not oppose a mass expulsion of Soviet intelligence
officers from the US. Any Soviet retaliation would no longer hurt the
CIA in Moscow. The defection of Edward Lee Howard had almost put the CIA
out of business there and it could afford to lose the entire station.
Essentially, all the covert Soviet agents who had been operated by the
CIA or FBI had been arrested in Moscow. It was later to be determined
that this was the result of information passed to the Soviets by Howard
and Ames.
Nevertheless,
this was a crucial position for DCI Casey to take because, without his
support, the President would never have agreed to a mass expulsion.
Faced with a new situation, DCI Casey had the capacity to look at the
problem and accept a solution that could help the country in the long
term; his organization in the short term. Thus, the NSC/ID staff was
tasked to work with the FBI to draw up a list of the most important KGB
and GRU intelligence officers in the United States, if expelled, would
be the most damaging to Soviet operations.
The
Final and Most Crucial Decisions
The
overall strategy for dealing with Soviet espionage, which had started
almost four years earlier, began to take shape on August 30, 1986.
Gennadiy Fedorovich Zakharov, a Soviet national employed by the UN
Secretariat, was arrested by the FBI and charged with conspiracy to
commit espionage. Zakharov did not have diplomatic immunity and, thus,
faced the prospect of serving time in a federal penitentiary. His
espionage activity was particularly offensive since he had recruited his
agent on a college campus while passing himself off as an international
civil servant.16 From a policy prospective, the NSC staff and
the IC saw this as an attempt on the part of the Soviets, faced with the
reduced presence of diplomatic protected personnel, to shift greater
operational flexibility to the unprotected KGB and GRU officers working
in the UN Secretariat.
On
September 2, 1986, the Soviets responded by arresting Nicholas Daniloff,
a US News and World Report journalist stationed in Moscow. He was
charged with receiving classified information from his contact
�Misha.�17 The CIA advised the President and publicly
declared that Daniloff was not connected with US intelligence in any
way. As they had in the past, the Soviets had taken an American citizen
hostage when one of their diplomatically unprotected intelligence
officers was arrested for espionage.
In
September 1986 President Reagan, who was on vacation in California,
exchanged a number of classified messages concerning this matter, via
the hot line, with Soviet leader Gorbachev. They exchanged very strong
denunciations of both arrests and demanded the release of both Daniloff
and Zakharov.
During
this period, the NSC staff, including the ID and the Senior Director of
the European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, Jack F. Matlock Jr., worked
together on this issue on a full-time basis. The Administration, took a
particular strong position over this event because the evidence for
Zakharov�s involvement in espionage was indisputable, while Daniloff
had not worked for the CIA in any capacity. Matlock took a very hard
stance and proposed a number of very strong response options against the
Soviets during this period. Meanwhile the issue dominated the news
media, with each government�s spokesman stating that bilateral
relations would not move forward until the issue was resolved.
A
number of policy options for responsive action were prepared by the NSC
staff in concert with the Intelligence Community, as well as
independently. When President Reagan returned from California it became
obvious that he had been thinking about this issue for sometime and had
decided on three objectives and actions to resolve the situation. None
of the options prepared by the NSC staff were the ones he chose. As a
result of the President�s guidance, the following events occurred
between September 12, 1986 and October 26, 1986:
September
12, 1986
Following
diplomatic discussion, Daniloff and Zakharov were released into the
custody of their respective ambassadors, pending court actions.
September
13, 1986
In
response to press inquires concerning the pending departure of the
first 25 Soviets from the Missions, due on October 1, 1986, Soviet
Ambassador Belogonov advised that the Soviet Government had no
intention of complying with the �illegal� order and the US still
had the time to withdraw from this policy decision.
September
16, 1986
In
direct response to Ambassador Belogonov�s comments, the President
decided to have the FBI select the first 25 Soviets to depart the US
from New York by October 1, 1986.
September
17, 1986
Soviet
Ambassador Belogonov was given the names of 25 KGB and GRU officers in
New York who must depart the US by October 1, 1986.
September
18, 1986
The
Soviets were privately advised that the New York expulsions had
nothing to do with Soviet-US bilateral diplomatic presence.
Accordingly, if the Soviets were to expel any US diplomats in response
to the 25 Soviets ordered to depart New York, the US would reduce the
Soviet bilateral presence from 320 to 251, which was the number of US
diplomats in the Soviet Union. The Soviets protested, but were told
this was not a threat but a simple fact, and a Presidential decision.
The Soviets were also told the entire issue could be solved if they
would release Daniloff with no charges.
September
19,1986
Secretary
of State Shultz met with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in the
State Department. According to prior planning, during this meeting
Shultz advised Shevardnzadze that the President was very concerned
over this affair and, to prove the point, Shultz took him directly to
the President waiting in the Oval Office. Reagan advised Shevardnadze
that Daniloff was not connected with the CIA and that all bilateral
issues would be on hold unless he were released. Shevardnadze agreed
to meet with State Department representatives that weekend to work out
a solution. He then produced a letter from Gorbachev inviting Reagan
to a summit meeting in Iceland from October 11-13, 1986. The President
agreed, pending an acceptable resolution concerning Daniloff.
Attention in the NSC turned to short term planning for the summit
meeting.
September
20, 1986
The
NSC/ID staff proposed that Zakharov plead nolo contendere and
be returned to the Soviet Union. Daniloff was to be returned to the
US, not pleading to any Soviet charges. This proposal was accepted by
all agencies, since it broke the link between Zakharov�s espionage
and Daniloff being held hostage and supported President�s enunciated
objectives. Here the NSC/ID staff played a crucial role in the
process, because the nolo contendere option was not being
proposed by any government agency. By having an FBI Special Agent on
the NSC/ID staff and involved in the process, this option surfaced and
was readily accepted as a positive solution.
September
23, 1986
Following
a weekend of negotiations in New York between the State Department and
Soviet officials, Daniloff was released without charges. As part of
the arrangement, Soviet dissident Yuri Orlov was released to the West
and Zakharov, after pleading nolo contendere, was allowed to
fly back to Moscow.
October
11-13, 1986
The
Iceland Summit was held with much hope for strategic disarmament but
reached no agreements. Eleven of the 25 expelled Soviets remained in
New York. Prior to the summit, the Soviets had promised to withdraw
the last of the 25 officials as soon as possible, but no later than
October 19, 1986.
October
14, 1986
The
last 11 Soviets identified by the FBI departed New York via a German
airline. That they did not use Aeroflot was seen as an indication that
the Soviets planned to retaliate for the expulsions.
October
19,1986
The
Soviet government named and expelled five US diplomats in Moscow. In
addition, the Soviets withdrew the 260 Soviet nationals working in the
US Embassy in Moscow and Consulate in Leningrad. The expulsion of the
US diplomats came as no surprise. The withdrawal of the Russian
employees accomplished for the US what it had been unwilling or unable
to do for itself.
On October
21, 1986, a meeting was held to discuss actions in response to these
expulsions in Moscow. The meeting considered that, on September 18, the
US had warned the Soviets what would happen if they took such an action.
The US had stated that it would respond by drawing the Soviet presence
down to equal the US level in Moscow. Given that it was imperative for
the US to maintain credibility as a basis for future arms agreements,
the Soviet Union had to view the Administration as standing by its
decisions. Accordingly, it was imperative that the Administrative follow
through with its decision to draw the Soviets down to equal the US
presence in the Soviet Union. That action also presented the opportunity
to achieve another Presidential objective by eliminating many of the KGB
and GRU intelligence officers in the United States, at least for a
period of time. The President approved of implementing the action.
APNSA
Poindexter, supported by the NSC/ID, played a key role during this
process, by continuing to put the long range strategy on the policy
table and ensuring that the President�s objectives were continually
considered and ultimately fulfilled. His leadership during this process
was a crucial reason the decisions were made.
As of October
21, 1986, there were 30 Soviets on diplomatic bilateral assignments
in the US and 251 US diplomats in the Soviet Union. Thus, 55 Soviets
were to be expelled -- 50 Soviets to reach parity, plus an addition five
to respond to the five expelled from Moscow on October 19. The FBI was
tasked to identify the 55 to be expelled. The list included 42 from the
Soviet diplomatic establishments in Washington and 13 from the Soviet
Consulate in San Francisco.
On October
22, 1986, the Soviets were advised of this decision. The list did
not include all the Soviet intelligence personnel in the US, but it did
include the entire leadership of the KGB and GRU. All the Rezidents, KGB
Line Chiefs and key intelligence officers were expelled.18
On October
26, 1986, the Soviets responded by expelling five additional US
diplomats in Moscow and the US government chose not to respond The
Soviets had lost 100 officials, of whom at least 81 -- those 25 and 55
identified by the FBI plus Zakharov -� were KGB and GRU intelligence
officers. In total, there were 26 from New York -- counting Zakharov who
had departed in September 1986 -- 42 from Washington, 13 from San
Francisco. An additional 19 diplomats from Washington, who were out of
the US on October 22, were not allowed to return -- the difference
between the Soviet complement of 320 and the 301 actually in country on
this date.
Success
is Achieved
After
years of interagency debates, meetings, policy discussions and the
involvement of the senior leadership of the Administration, Soviet
intelligence was severely damaged. On October 27, 1986, former KGB
Colonel and Rezident in London, Oleg Gordievsky declared this �the end
of an era� for Soviet intelligence in the United States. He advised
that the KGB had always considered it feasible to assign as many
intelligence officers as it wanted in the United States because the US
�would never do anything about it.� The Soviets had suffered mass
expulsions in France, England, Canada, Spain and other countries around
the world, but never in the US. No matter how many Soviet espionage
cases were discovered, the US never took drastic action. The Soviets had
concluded that concerns over disarmament and good bilateral
relationships would always outweigh efforts to deal with Soviet
espionage. Faced with this mass expulsion of 80 intelligence officers,
the Soviets would have to reevaluate their assumptions on US national
security decisionmaking.19
Soviet-US
relations continued to develop after this affair closed in October 1986.
The Soviets continued to withdraw personnel from their official presence
in New York in 1987 and completed it in April 1988. Discussions
continued concerning arms reductions throughout 1987, leading to the
signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in December
1987. Summits continued to be held and the US continued to support
democratic changes in the Soviet Union. It has been argued that, as a
result of this experience, Gorbachev learned that Reagan and Bush could
make difficult decisions and would stand by their word. What is clear is
that dialogue continued and the threat of espionage in the US was
decreased for a period of time. Estimates are that the KGB and GRU were
on, essentially an operational stand down for at least two years in the
United States.
Conclusion
The
October 23, 1986 Washington Post editorial stated that the route by
which this decision was made was obscure. Indeed, there were many forces
that affected the process by which these decisions were made. The
decision was not easy, but proved to be one of the most important that
the President made in the defense of the United States.
President
Reagan played a crucial role in this decision. He established his
objectives early in the Administration and followed through. He was
directly involved in this most difficult and controversial decision,
which received little public understanding or support.
Clearly,
the NSC/ID played an instrumental role in keeping the focus on the issue
of espionage and policy options to challenge the threat. It was the NSC/ID
that forced the Intelligence Community to continue to study the problem
and, while the recommendations for improvements were developed by the
interagency process, it was the NSC/ID staff that ensured that they
received Presidential attention.
Faced
with a Presidential decision to implement NSDD-196, the Secretary of
State supported the President�s decisions over the opposition of the
State Department bureaucracy. The State Department changed its a long
standing position that the US government could not prevent the large
number of Soviets at the UN. This led to reductions in both New York and
Washington, as well as San Francisco.
DCI
Casey showed a great deal of flexibility by recommending a mass
expulsion of Soviet intelligence personnel when the opportunity
presented itself after Edward Lee Howard defected and all CIA agents in
Moscow, as well as the entire Moscow CIA operation, had been
compromised. When Daniloff was arrested, the DCI was one of the
strongest proponents of taking advantage of the situation to achieve the
objective.
The
series of decisions by the national security policy team illustrates
that a strong CI program, from both the policy and operational
perspective, can coexist with cooperative relations. Nations can and
will �dual track� foreign policy if it is in their national interest
to do so. This does not conform to conventional wisdom, which holds that
all international relationships are interrelated and linked.
Unfortunately, this foreign policy success of the Reagan Administration
was not fully understood and fell from public view quickly when the
Iran-Contra Affair entered the public domain on November 5, 1986.
Epilogue
Counterintelligence
once again became a public issue on February 21, 1994 with the
announcement of the arrest of Aldridge Ames as a Soviet, turned Russian,
clandestine agent. Once again, Congress held hearings and the
administration conducted a number of reviews to deal with the
�espionage problem.� Once again, the damage assessment teams formed
within the corridors of the Intelligence Community. Once again, the
Inspector Generals of the CIA, then the FBI, went to work to find out
�who was at fault� for catching the �most damaging spy in
history.� Once again, the critics began to complain about not enough
commitment to CI.
Partly
in response to CI concerns raised in the wake of the Ames case, in 1995,
Congress and the Administration established the Commission on the Roles
and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community. This
Commission, known as the Aspin Commission. is specifically tasked to
study 19 items, only one of which is related to counterintelligence.
This question, number 16,
asks:
"...whether
counterintelligence policies and practices are adequate to ensure
that employees of the intelligence agencies are sensitive to
security problems and whether intelligence agencies themselves have
adequate authority and capability to address perceived security
problems." 20
One
need look no farther to appreciate just how thin the understanding is
that CI must be a continuing strategic effort. The question does not
address the issues of the roles, missions, funding, staffing, training
and cooperation necessary for a national strategic CI program. No one
appointed to the Aspin Commission has CI expertise. As such, the
challenges for national strategic CI remain monumental.
Nevertheless,
there are some good omens for the future of CI. The Clinton
Administration publicly issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-24
that reorganized the CI community. A National Counterintelligence Policy
Board (NACIPB) was formed to replace the SIG/I, the IG/CI, and the
NAG/CI. This NACIPB reports to the NSC, not the DCI.21 A National
Counterintelligence Center was formed in August 1994, led by a former
Director of Counterintelligence from the NSC/ID staff (1991-1994 ).22
The
second individual to hold the position of Director of
Counterintelligence, NSC/ID (1987-1989) was appointed as the Deputy
Assistant Director for Operations within the National Security Division
of the FBI in 1995. He is responsible for all counterintelligence
investigations and operations conducted by the FBI worldwide.
The
fifth individual to hold the position of Director of Counterintelligence
at the NSC/ID (1994-1995) was the principal drafter of the PDD and was
in position during the Ames crisis. He has now been appointed the
Special Agent-in-Charge of CI within the FBI.
Accordingly,
there are personnel in key assignments throughout the CI community who
understand that CI is a strategic issue that will face our nation well
into the 21st century. It will be their task, and the task of countless
others who are now developing their CI expertise, to understand that
human nature doesn�t change. The same kind of human motives and
desires exist today as in Hutchenson�s time when this great country
was established. Yet we as a citizenry, unlike our forefathers, seem so
unaware of how much is at risk from the commission of crimes that
violate the public trust
Notes
1. Washington
Post, 23 October 1986, editorial page.
2. The
Foreign Intelligence Threat to U.S. Defense Industry, Department of
Defense Security Institute, Richmond, Virginia, unclassified, undated;
9.
3. Keeping
the Nation�s Secrets: A Report to the Secretary of Defense by the
Commission to Review DoD Security Policies and Practices, 19
November 1985; 1.
4. lbid;
5-6.
5. Meeting
the Espionage Challenge. A Review of United States Counterintelligence
and Security Programs, Report of the Select Committee on
Intelligence, United States Senate, Report 99-522, 99th
Congress 2nd Session, issued 3 October 1986 (legislative day, 23
September); 12-13.
6.
Executive Order 12076, �United States Intelligence Activities,�
1978.
7. A
Report to Congress on the Nation�s Counterintelligence and Security
Countermeasures Plans Programs and Capabilities from the President in
response to Public Law 99-169, dated September 1986, portions
unclassified.
8.
Executive Order 12333, �United States Intelligence Activities,�
4 December 1981; Part 1 paragraph 1.1 (c).
9. A
report to Congress...1982, portions unclassified.
10. Meeting
the Espionage Challenge; 20-23.
11. Meeting
the Espionage Challenge; 40.
12. Meeting
the Espionage Challenge; 40-41.
13. Report
of Investigation: the Aldrich Ames Espionage Case, House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, 30 November 1994. �An
Assessment of the Aldridge H. Ames Espionage Case and Its Implications
for U.S. Intelligence,� SSCI Report Number 103-90, 1 November
1994; 11-14.
14.
National Security Decision Directive-196, �Counterintelligence
Countermeasures Implementing Task Force,� 1 November 1985,
unclassified portions.
15. Meeting
the Espionage Challenge; 41. Rick Layman, �Soviet Envoy says U.S.
Unjustified in Expulsions,� Philadelphia Inquirer, 19 September
1986; 14.
16. Meeting
the Espionage Challenge, Appendix E; 136-141.
17.
Philip Taubman, �Daniloff�s Unwitting Role in Intrigue,� New
York Times, 6 October 1986; 14.
18.
Bill Gertz, �Expulsions� Decapitate Soviet Spy Network,� Washington
Times, 23 October 1986; 1. John Goshko, �US Expelling 55 Soviet
Diplomats as Clash Escalates,� The Washington Post 23 October
1986; 1.
19.
Interview with Oleg Gordievsky by author, 27 October 1986. Christopher
Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story, 1990; 510.
20.
ASPIN Commission
21. PDD
22. The
Directors of Counter Intelligence on the NSC/ID staff have
been:
1.
SSA David Major, 1985-1987
2.
SSA John Lewis, 1987-1989
3.
SSA David Kitchen, 1989-1991
4.
SSA Michael Waugespack 1991-1994
5.
SSA Raymond Mislock 1994-1995
6.
SSA Edward Apple, 1995-
Copyright �
1995 by David G. Major. Not to be reprinted or reproduced in any form
without express written permission from the author |
