Pat Finucane Review

Chapter 11: The flow of information from members of the security forces to the UDA

11.1 In Chapter 1 I outlined my working definition of collusion. Collusion must be considered to include members of the security forces knowingly providing information to terrorist groups intent on assassinating individuals. The provision of such assistance to loyalist paramilitaries during the late 1980s has often been referred to as 'leaks'.

11.2 Before considering the issue of collusion between members of the security forces and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) in the murder of Patrick Finucane, I have sought to establish the extent to which members of the security forces were generally assisting the UDA during this period. Some aspects of this issue were investigated by Sir John Stevens in his first investigation, but in view of information which has only subsequently come to light, I have decided that it is necessary to conduct a fresh analysis.

The context

11.3 The context in which the security forces operated in Northern Ireland during this period must be considered before analysing the scale and nature of leaks from members of the security forces to loyalist paramilitaries.

11.4 In the late 1980s, high levels of security force personnel were maintained in order to tackle the paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland. In 1989, there were over 11,277 full-time RUC officers and 1,605 RUC officers working in the Part-Time Reserve. The Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) had 2,947 full-time officers and 3,283 part-time officers.^[1] The regular British Army had 11,200 officers serving in Northern Ireland in 1989.

11.5 The large numbers of security force personnel, many living within tightly knit communities in Northern Ireland at the time, undoubtedly meant that occasional instances of association with paramilitaries and the exchange of information were almost inevitable. Even the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), which sought to murder members of the security forces, was at times able to cultivate and maintain a limited number of sources working for the security forces in some capacity.

11.6 In this context, I agree with the view expressed by Sir John Stevens in 1990 that:

"It must be acknowledged, that in the present climate, leakages of information from the Security Forces may never be completely eliminated." ^[2]

11.7 I do not, therefore, base any assessment of this issue on the assumption that the security forces should have been able to prevent leaks of any kind to loyalist paramilitaries in the late 1980s.

11.8 However, whilst the context of the time may indeed explain why there were leaks to loyalist paramilitaries, it cannot, in my view, justify any assistance being provided by members of the security forces to loyalist terrorists. Nor could it justify an acceptance by the security forces and intelligence agencies that such leaks had to be tolerated as inevitable. The trust of the public in the security forces demands that individuals tasked with upholding the rule of law must adhere to the highest possible standards of conduct and that any allegations as serious as collusion with members of paramilitary organisations must be investigated with the utmost rigour.

The scale and nature of leaks from the security forces

The sources of evidence

11.9 I have identified two key contemporaneous sources of evidence that enable me to analyse a sample of the leaks of information from the security forces to the UDA in the late 1980s:

(i) the Force Research Unit Contact Forms (FRU CFs) recording Brian Nelson's reporting of security force leaks to the UDA in the period 1987-89;^[3] and

(ii) the Security Service's compendium of leaks from members of the security forces to loyalist paramilitaries in the period 1987-89.^[4]

11.10 I have not considered it necessary or desirable to conduct a mini-investigation into the intelligence reporting of every leak. To fulfil my remit, it is necessary for me to provide only a strategic overview of the prevalence and nature of the assistance being given by members of the security forces to loyalist paramilitaries.

11.11 In providing such an overview, I have borne in mind the possibility that some alleged leaks may have been examples of loyalist paramilitaries inventing or exaggerating supposed security force 'contacts' in order to increase their standing within the UDA. However, having discounted questionable second-hand reports of leaks, I am satisfied that this was not the case in relation to the majority of the remaining leaks reported in the FRU and Security Service intelligence. UDA members received accurate and sensitive targeting information on republicans; information about the identity of informers; advance notice of arrests and operations; and, on occasions, weapons. In most cases, it was simply not possible for the UDA to receive such accurate information or equipment from any source other than members of the security forces.

11.12 I should also note that the sources of the information upon which I am basing my analysis - namely Brian Nelson's intelligence passed to his FRU handlers and the Security Service's intelligence drawn from human and technical sources - were considered to be established and reliable by the intelligence agencies at the time. I broadly agree with that assessment. Whilst I do have some reservations about Nelson's reliability, this mainly relates to his capacity to withhold information from his handlers rather than the veracity of the information that he did provide.

11.13 A number of Brian Nelson's reports of leaks were confirmed by the contemporaneous copies of security force documents that he was able to pass to his handlers. These documents establish beyond doubt that a leak of information had taken place and do tend to suggest that Nelson was reliably reporting security force leaks to his handlers.

Analysis of the scale of leaks

11.14 In order to establish the scale of the problem, I have considered the cumulative pattern of leaks to the UDA by combining the FRU and Security Service records. My analysis is based on the leaks recorded in FRU CFs from June 1987 until September 1989 when combined with the Security Service's record of leaks from the start of 1987 until September 1989.

11.15 I have cross-checked the leaks recorded by the FRU and the Security Service and removed any examples that may have been duplicates recorded by both agencies. I have also excluded from consideration any self-evidently dubious reports of leaks or examples of occasions on which members of the security forces may have had legitimate contact with loyalist paramilitaries (for example, for the purpose of public order policing, or to warn an individual of a threat against them). The combined figures show 270 separate instances of assistance provided by members of the security forces to loyalist paramilitaries during the period 1987 to September 1989.

11.16 Some leaks, notably in relation to the checking of vehicle registration details, appear to relate to a single security force 'contact' who provided assistance to the UDA on a number of separate occasions. The majority of the recorded leaks do, however, appear to relate to different members of the security forces providing assistance to the UDA. The nature of the intelligence received by the Security Service and the FRU tended to mean that the reporting covered a broad spectrum of leaks rather than recording multiple examples of leaks from the same individual. There is, for example, no evidence to suggest that Brian Nelson sought to cultivate a Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) or UDR contact to feed him information to assist him in his role as Intelligence Officer for the UDA. Instead, Nelson relied on a wider variety of leaked information from a number of individuals within the UDA who had their own security force contacts.

11.17 It should be stressed that the limitations of these sources and the nature of the records mean that this analysis can only provide a restricted sample of the actual scale of assistance provided by members of the security forces to loyalist paramilitaries. As the Security Service noted in their assessment of the compendium of leaks, it is:

"… crucial to be clear that this [the Security Service compendium] does not necessarily represent a full, or even a balanced picture." ^[5]

11.18 The figures I have produced are, therefore, likely to represent only a small sample of a wider problem. In particular, the analysis is very heavily weighted towards security force leaks to the UDA in the Belfast area. I should also note that I have analysed the provision of information to Brian Nelson by the FRU and the RUC Special Branch (SB) separately in Chapter 7 and have not included those examples within these statistics.

11.19 Figure 9 outlines this sample of security force leaks to loyalist paramilitaries by type during the period January 1987 to September 1989.

Figure 9: Instances of security force leaks to loyalist paramilitaries by origin and type, 1987-89

11.20 In many instances it is difficult to establish with certainty from which particular branch of the security forces a leak may have originated. Both the RUC and the UDR, for example, had the ability to conduct checks on vehicle registration details and both organisations had access to montage photographs of suspected republican terrorists. Figure 10 suggests that, in cases where it is possible to ascertain the source of the leak, members of the RUC and the UDR were probably responsible in broadly equal measure for the assistance provided to loyalist paramilitaries, with a significantly smaller degree of assistance provided by members of the regular British Army. I should note that I have seen no evidence to suggest that there was any leak from the Security Service during this period.

Figure 10: Origin of security force leaks, 1987-89

11.21 The most common form of leak from members of the security forces to loyalist paramilitaries was targeting information on republican terrorists. This often consisted of security force documents or information communicated verbally providing details about an individual suspected of being a member of PIRA. As shown in Figure 11, nearly half of all recorded leaks referred to targeting information. I have included vehicle registration checks as a separate category of information being passed to loyalist paramilitaries, though in practice many of these vehicle details would have been supplied and used for targeting purposes.

Figure 11: Type of security force leaks, 1987-89

Other sources of evidence

11.22 I should note that much of the broader documentary evidence I have reviewed tends to support the impression that a significant degree of assistance was provided by members of the security forces to loyalist paramilitaries during the late 1980s. In order to provide some context to this chapter, I have released documentation in Volume II of this Report outlining the contents of Brian Nelson's intelligence dump and Security Service assessments produced at the time.

11.23 Intelligence assessments produced by the Security Service consistently noted that the majority of UDA intelligence came from security force sources. An assessment produced in 1985 suggested that the UDA had thousands of items of intelligence material and that 85% of this was drawn from security force records.^[6] A Security Service report produced in the spring of 1986 noted that:

"The flow of intelligence on Republican targets has greatly increased since the AIA [Anglo-Irish Agreement] was signed and the Inner Council now believe that the UDA is in a position to mount an effective campaign." ^[7]

11.24 A further Security Service report in 1986 described the targeting intelligence being received by the UDA as coming "largely from RUC and UDR sources".^[8] Intelligence received in October 1987 recorded that the UDA had "much information on republicans drawn from UDR or RUC contacts".^[9]

11.25 I have not included statistics from the RUC SB Daily Intelligence Book in the above analysis because the records in existence only date from December 1988. Nevertheless, an examination of the Daily Intelligence Book shows that it provides supporting evidence in relation to the scale and nature of the leaks illustrated by the FRU and Security Service intelligence.

11.26 In addition to the CFs recording examples of leaks, Nelson's intelligence dump itself illustrates the scale of leaked security force information reaching the UDA.^[10]

11.27 A large quantity of the information in the dump clearly originated from the security forces. The photographs, for example, were normally of suspects in police custody.^[11] Nelson also made use of 'civilian' material such as maps, the Electoral Roll and newspapers and other publications whilst working as a FRU agent and UDA Intelligence Officer.^[12]

11.28 The FRU had access to this intelligence dump from the autumn of 1987. On 4 September 1987, the FRU handlers photocopied the files that Nelson had received from L/35. The handlers noted that the files contained:

"… typed and written lists of Nationalist suspect terrorists. The files also contain air photographs, maps and photographs. A considerable number of the photographs are original copies of the City Sighting List … A considerable number of the photographs and files appear to originate from RUC sources." ^[13]

11.29 In October 1987, Nelson handed over his intelligence dump to his FRU handlers. A FRU file note included an itemised list of his intelligence cache. The list included "500 A4 RUC P file cards", RUC statements relating to the arrest of L/35 in 1986, Garda reports, British Army 'P card' files and military maps, though the FRU handlers noted that this was only a "sample" of the documents supplied by Nelson. Some of these items, including the "500 RUC P file cards", were lent to the RUC Source Unit "for evaluation". Consequently the RUC SB were fully aware that a significant quantity of security force information had fallen into the hands of the UDA.^[14]

11.30 Nelson gave a detailed description to the Stevens I Investigation as to the source of the UDA's intelligence. In his statement dated 19 February 1990, he noted that:

"Information was received in [sic] a number of methods and from a number of sources. Primary source material was in the form of montages obtained from the Military and the R.U.C. This was classed within the UDA as High Grade information as having originated from those two sources. I never knew who originally supplied this material. Handwritten notes containing information about known players would also originate from the Military. I would say that ninety nine percent involved the UDR. Other means of information was gleaned from the use of Scanners to monitor Police Transmission. Other information came from person to person contact on the activities of certain individuals and from Republican Newspapers." ^[15]

11.31 Nelson explained that information would also be passed orally by members of the security forces to the UDA. He described this channel of communication as follows:

"When I mean information passed from mouth to mouth I mean Tucker Lyttle had a contact in Special Branch, [L/03's] contact is in the UDR and [L/35's] contact within the RUC. These are to name just a few because many UDA members have friends and relatives within the Security Forces. It lends itself to a vast amount of information." ^[16]

11.32 The nature of the intelligence recorded by Nelson makes it difficult to quantify how many individuals in the security forces might have been passing information to loyalist paramilitaries at any given time. RUC intelligence received in November 1988 suggested that "in each UDA 'area' there were approximately 20 Police 'contacts' ". ^[17]

11.33 The source of this information was graded as reliable by the RUC SB at the time, though I am cautious about seeking to draw conclusions on the basis of what might be a somewhat arbitrary estimate. It is certainly clear, however, that each UDA 'area' would have been able to draw on a number of UDR and RUC contacts.

The seriousness of the leaks

11.34 As I note later in this chapter, the limited briefing provided to Ministers on this issue tended to suggest that the leaks of information to loyalist paramilitaries related to comparatively 'low-level' material being provided to them by members of the security forces.

11.35 It is no doubt true that junior UDR or RUC officers passing on so-called 'low-level' material were responsible for the majority of the leaks in numerical terms. However, I have been struck by the fact that the information that was being passed on did sometimes include sensitive intelligence information based on source reporting or surveillance. For example, in 1985 the UDA had access to a small number of RUC intelligence reports (RIRACs) and Military Intelligence Source Reports (MISRs), both of which were highly sensitive categories of document.^[18]

11.36 In order to illustrate the seriousness of some leaks, I have summarised below the key examples of assistance being provided to loyalist paramilitaries at an ostensibly high level within the security forces.

Alleged high-level leaks in the mid-1980s

11.37 In the mid-1980s, the Security Service received intelligence that an unnamed and potentially very senior RUC officer might be assisting loyalist paramilitaries to procure arms. I should note that this arms procurement appears to have been unsuccessful and was unrelated to the separate partially successful importation of arms by loyalists in late 1987/early 1988.

11.38 The Security Service discussed the intelligence they had received with the then Deputy Head of Special Branch (DHSB). Security Service telegrams record the DHSB as having said that "the possibility of a high level RUC contact was a real one".^[19]

11.39 The DHSB privately mentioned a specific high-level RUC officer who might have been responsible for providing assistance to the loyalist paramilitaries. The reports were sufficiently serious to prompt a Security Service investigation and a series of discussions and memos between the DCI, the Director of the Counter-Terrorism FX Branch, Patrick Walker, and the then Director General, Sir John Jones.

11.40 The intelligence was insufficiently specific to establish the source of the leak and the investigation appears to have ultimately petered out. However, the subsequent flow and analysis of intelligence did tend to support the theory that a high-level RUC 'contact' was assisting loyalists. More than seven months after the initial intelligence, further discussions took place about the loyalist grouping that the RUC contact may have been associated with. The DHSB was recorded as continuing to believe that the reports of a high-level RUC connection were "quite credible".

11.41 Whilst the potential link to a specific officer could not be proven, Security Service officers evidently still believed that the high-level RUC connection was of serious concern. A Service officer noted in an internal memo that:

"… we must resist widening the circle of knowledge [over loyalist arms procurement] throughout the RUC as [the Security Service's Head of the Assessments Group] wishes to do. The story of [a very senior officer] in the RUC being involved is still so consistent that [a Security Service asset] could end up in real trouble." ^[20]

11.42 Whilst I acknowledge that the intelligence did not enable the individual officer concerned to be confidently identified, I consider that the documentary record as a whole does suggest that it is likely that a high-level RUC contact assisted loyalist paramilitaries to an extent in their efforts to procure arms in the mid-1980s.

Alleged 'high-level' leaks to loyalists in the late 1980s

11.43 The FRU and Security Service reports from the period 1987-89 also suggest that a small number of senior police and Army officers may have been providing assistance to loyalist paramilitaries. Reliable and repeated reports covered comparatively senior officers in the RUC through to senior officers in the UDR, though such individuals were not always identifiable on the basis of the intelligence that had been received.

11.44 Several Security Service reports in the summer of 1988 suggested that an individual centrally involved in the loyalist arms procurement in the late 1980s received assistance from contacts in the RUC and the UDR. The loyalist concerned received a tip-off alerting him to the fact that RUC surveillance was in place against an arms movement operation. However, whilst the operation was certainly compromised, the intelligence appears to have been too generalised to enable the source of the leak to be identified, though the Service noted that they were "confident" that the leak had not come from the RUC SB. A later report in July 1988 was cited as providing "a further indication of some RUC protection of his [the loyalist involved in arms procurement] activities".^[21]

11.45 Again, caution is required when interpreting these reports given the possibility that loyalist paramilitaries might seek to exaggerate the seniority and importance of their security force 'contacts', or indeed that security force personnel might exaggerate their own importance when providing information to loyalists. As the Security Service noted in their September 1989 assessment:

"… we must aim off in relation to some of these reports against the possibility that they stem from unfounded 'big talk' or exaggeration on the part of paramilitaries about having police contacts in high places." ^[22]

11.46 Nevertheless, the intelligence reports pointing to assistance being provided by a small number of comparatively senior figures are sufficiently compelling and consistent to lead me to believe that at least some of the reports are likely to be founded in truth.

11.47 It is important to note that some of the more serious leaks of 'high-level' information may have emanated from comparatively junior officers working on particularly sensitive areas of RUC operations. Officers working in such sensitive posts, including the Headquarters Mobile Support Unit (HMSU) and the surveillance section, E4A, were linked to loyalist paramilitaries in a series of reliable FRU and Security Service intelligence reports in the period 1988-89. Potential links between E4A and the UDA are outlined in more detail in Chapter 19.

The link between leaks and UDA murders in the late 1980s

11.48 In order to illustrate the seriousness of the leaks provided by members of the security forces to the UDA, I have analysed the links between such 'leaks' and UDA murders in the period 1987-89.

11.49 In Chapter 7 I covered at length Nelson's involvement in UDA attacks and murders. It is clear that in many cases leaked security force information played some part in the attacks. I deal with the murder of Loughlin Maginn separately below. Whilst I have not conducted a full examination of other UDA murders with which Nelson had no involvement, much of the documentary evidence I have reviewed suggests that leaked security force information played a part in a number of other attacks.

11.50 It should be recognised that leaked security force information did not necessarily result in the UDA being able to murder their intended victim. The murder of David Dornan in Lisburn on 25 January 1989, for example, appears to have been a case of mistaken identity after security force 'contacts' provided intelligence to the UDA relating to the presence of another individual on the same building site. Reliable intelligence reports later indicated that the UDA had been initially tipped off by a member of the UDR and had 'confirmed' the presence of the PIRA figure believed to be on the building site with an RUC contact.^[23]

11.51 Security force leaks were made even more dangerous by the fact that the UDA tended to assume that security force contacts were providing infallible and immediately 'actionable' information. As the murder of David Dornan illustrated, the UDA might therefore act immediately to carry out attacks on the basis of such 'intelligence' without carrying out the more detailed targeting process that in practice acted as a brake on the rate at which murders were committed.

11.52 A Security Service assessment of the UDA circulated on 24 May 1989 reinforced this impression. The assessment noted that:

"[The] UDA recognises the need to corroborate intelligence, but if it comes from RUC or UDR sources, it tends to be taken as authoritative." ^[24]

11.53 I have no doubt that most UDA targeting and attacks during the late 1980s could be traced back to initial security force leaks, though that is not to say that loyalists did not occasionally carry out spontaneous killings during this period. The commissioning of the Stevens I Investigation no doubt provided an important deterrent in relation to leaks, though the UDA certainly continued to seek security force information. Security Service intelligence received in late 1990 suggested that the UDA Inner Council had changed their approach to intelligence-gathering but had decided that:

"Initial leads [on targets] would still come from the UDR or RUC." ^[25]

The limitations of the leaks

11.54 It is important to note that, although security force leaks to loyalist paramilitaries were widespread, they were none the less limited in scope. As I noted at paragraph 11.4, thousands of individuals were serving in the security forces at this time. I am satisfied that the majority of members of the RUC and the UDR did not provide assistance or information of any kind to loyalist paramilitaries.

11.55 The fact that the intelligence agencies and security forces were able to mount a number of successful operations against loyalist paramilitaries during this period also highlights the limitations of the leaks. Loyalist paramilitaries undoubtedly received 'tip-offs' from security force 'contacts' about arrests, surveillance and the presence of informers in their organisations. However, there were equally many successful investigations and arrests conducted without the loyalists' knowledge. Agents such as Brian Nelson were, despite the risks, able to operate for a number of years without being unmasked.

11.56 I should also note that there is no evidence that the leaking of information to loyalist paramilitaries was part of a wider strategy within any branch of the security forces. There is no evidence, either in the records of conversations between loyalist paramilitaries or in the internal documents held by the intelligence agencies, to suggest that authorisation was given to members of the security forces to provide information to loyalist paramilitaries. The only cases that could be said to be exceptions to this relate to the provision of information to Brian Nelson as part of FRU/RUC SB operations to identify the source of leaks, or the operation relating to James Pratt Craig (both discussed in Chapter 7).

Action taken to prevent leaks

11.57 In my view, the scale and seriousness of the collusion between some members of the security forces and loyalist paramilitaries should have necessitated urgent and rigorous action on the part of the authorities to pursue those responsible.

11.58 I should note that some action does appear to have been taken by the Security Service in the mid-1980s with respect to leaks. The Service established two leak investigations during this period. The first investigation resulted in one Army officer under suspicion being posted back to England. The second leak investigation could not identify the culprit and was subsequently closed by the agreement of the Service and the Army. I am satisfied, however, that both investigations were rigorous and represented genuine attempts to identify the source of leaks to loyalist paramilitaries. Mobile surveillance and other resources were deployed to assist in identifying those responsible for the leaks.^[26]

11.59 Limited action does appear to have been taken with respect to some members of the UDR in the late 1980s. Several members of the UDR were convicted for criminal offences relating to loyalist terrorist activity during this period. An RUC SB note on the subversion in the UDR, dated 27 September 1989, cited other action that was taken against UDR officers thought to be passing information to loyalist paramilitaries. The note recorded that:

"… in some instances UDR members have been transferred to less sensitive posts as a consequence of such reports. In addition, members have been dismissed on occasions from the Regiment." ^[27]

11.60 I have seen some evidence to support this contention. As I noted in Chapter 10, intelligence provided by William Stobie did lead to an individual being dismissed from the UDR. In the light of source protection constraints, and the difficulty in proving specific offences against those suspected of leaking, transferring or dismissing individuals was potentially a reasonable course of action for the security forces to have followed. However, it must be said that, even with respect to the UDR, the action taken was minimal in view of the scale of the problem.

11.61 I should also note that the Stevens I Investigation exposed the serious problems inherent in the UDR vetting system. The Stevens team found 1,350 adverse RUC vetting reports on individuals seeking to join the UDR during the period 1988-89. Despite these reports, 351 of these individuals were subsequently found to have been enlisted into the UDR.^[28]

11.62 The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) has provided my Review with an overview of the response of the RUC to reports linking police officers to paramilitary groups during this period. In response to a request from my Review, the PSNI examined all personnel records between 1982 and 1989 to ascertain whether any disciplinary investigations or action had been taken as a result of RUC officers leaking information to loyalists. The PSNI confirmed that there was only one such investigation: this resulted in an officer suspected of involvement in the possession and transportation of firearms for loyalists in 1988 being dismissed from the RUC.^[29] The PSNI did, though, experience considerable difficulty in tracing disciplinary records from this period.

11.63 It is clear that other channels were used by the RUC in order to tackle the issue of leaks. The PSNI has provided my Review with 36 examples of action taken as a result of reports linking police officers to paramilitary activity.^[30] There are also some indications in the Security Service documentation that additional action may have been taken by the RUC through 'informal' channels.

11.64 One Security Service document suggests that individual RUC officers may have been informally 'warned off' associating with loyalist paramilitaries. Some records also reveal that senior RUC SB officers were concerned about police officers in sensitive posts leaking information but were constrained in their ability to tackle the problem. Security Service records, for example, show that in 1988 the DHSB considered surveillance against a suspect in the HMSU but felt that, given the individual's operational experience, "any covert operation against him would be fraught with difficulty".^[31]

11.65 Another Security Service document referred to the "genuine shock and anger"^[32] felt by the DHSB and an SB Detective Chief Inspector when they found out that a surveillance operation in the summer of 1988 had been compromised. They apparently investigated the leak but there is no record to suggest that the source was identified.

11.66 However, even taking into account the action that was taken, I have been unable to find any record of investigations being carried out in relation to the majority of intelligence reporting of leaks from RUC officers, though I do acknowledge that some intelligence reporting was insufficiently precise to enable any meaningful investigative action.

11.67 Of particular concern is the fact that neither I nor the Stevens Investigations have been able to find any evidence that any action was taken as a result of the recovery of a copied version of Brian Nelson's intelligence dump in October 1987. The copied version of the dump would itself have illustrated the scale of security force information in the hands of the UDA.

The background to the Stevens I Investigation

11.68 The case that prompted the Stevens I Investigation provides a useful example of the failure to take sufficient action to prevent security force leaks to the UDA.

11.69 The link between members of the UDR and the murder of Loughlin Maginn in Rathfriland, County Down on 25 August 1989 has been established for many years. The two UDR officers ultimately convicted in 1992 in relation to the murder had already been arrested and charged by the RUC prior to the Stevens Investigation being established by the Chief Constable on 14 September 1989.

11.70 However, there are a number of aspects to the case that do not appear to have been fully explored. The December 1988 UDA break-in to a UDR base in County Down provides, in my view, an illustration of the failure of the intelligence agencies to take action to prevent loyalists from obtaining information and assistance from members of the security forces.

11.71 In early December 1988 the intelligence agencies became aware that the UDA intended to enter a UDR base to obtain intelligence on individuals allegedly connected to republican terrorism. Brian Nelson was able to provide some intelligence prior to the UDA accessing the base and provided detailed intelligence to his handlers after the break-in.

11.72 Having analysed FRU, Security Service and RUC records, it is clear that a decision was taken by the RUC not to seek to prevent the UDA from obtaining the UDR intelligence material. A Security Service internal note recorded the following discussion with the RUC SB:

"[L/03] was planning to break into a UDR camp on 2 December to photograph some intelligence reports … We agreed that this was … odd … a view endorsed by D/HSB when I spoke to him subsequently. D/HSB advised that 'since the UDA already had lots of this stuff anyway' and that they would find nothing of value there was little to be gained by trying to prevent [L/03's] activity." [Emphasis added] ^[33]

11.73 Although it was certainly the case that the UDA had already obtained huge quantities of security force information, in practice the novelty of being able to obtain the intelligence directly from within a UDR barracks appears to have prompted them to place a particular significance on this information. It included a video tape of a UDR briefing that featured a number of individuals, including Maginn. The CF dated 6 December 1988 recorded that Nelson had viewed the video tape and also noted that the UDR members had apparently offered 'refuge' in the local barracks to the UDA hit team.^[34]

11.74 The UDA targeted a number of individuals featured on the tape but subsequently selected Maginn as a target. Nelson does not appear to have been involved in the targeting of Maginn but he did certainly encourage attacks to be made against those featured on the video tape. The CF dated 4 January 1989 recorded the following comment being made by Nelson (referred to here by his source number, 6137) to L/03:

"6137 suggested that if no attacks resulted on any of those mentioned on the video tape the UDR personnel who supplied it would not supply anymore." ^[35]

11.75 The video tape of the UDR briefing was subsequently shown to journalists by the UDA and ultimately prompted the Stevens I Investigation. The implications of the UDR/UDA links exposed in the CFs are acknowledged in the Ministry of Defence's (MoD's) own 'Problem Areas' document:

"The video was filmed in a UDR briefing room. This video led directly to the murder of Loughlin McGinn [sic]. [L/03] also goes on [as recorded in the 6 December 1988 CF] to say that a hit had been already planned in the Castlewellan area.

It was also explained that if the hit team could not escape they would be given refuge in barracks by certain members of the UDR.

This is potential dynamite. Should this become public knowledge the Security Forces, particularly the Royal Irish Regiment's credibility would be severely damaged." ^[36]

11.76 I should also note that the threat to Loughlin Maginn may also have increased as a result of information apparently leaked by an RUC officer to the UDA. The CF dated 30 August 1989 included the following account of a UDA meeting on 24 August attended by Nelson:

"Once [L/45] had been handed the material he stood up and said, I received this from an SB officer in Lisburn but some of it is mixed and if we were to target everyone in this we'd end up shooting one another." ^[37]

11.77 It is not clear whether L/45 was exaggerating when claiming that his contact was an SB officer, though it is certain that he must have had an RUC contact of some sort because I have seen a copy of the montage photographs that were provided by L/45 to Nelson (and subsequently by Nelson to his FRU handler). The handler commented on the CF that:

"It is interesting to note that one of the PIRA suspects named on the top sheet of paper was Loughlin Maginn who was assassinated later that evening." ^[38]

11.78 I should also note that L/45 was later able to tip off the UDA command on 6 January 1990 that its members would be arrested by the Stevens Investigation on 8 January. This information was accurate and seems likely to have been provided by an RUC 'contact' with advance knowledge of Stevens' arrest plans.^[39]

11.79 In summary, my examination of the background to the murder of Loughlin Maginn reveals that no attempt was made by the security forces to prevent the UDA from breaking into the UDR barracks and gaining the intelligence; that Brian Nelson subsequently encouraged UDA attacks on those featuring on the video tape; and that an RUC officer was reported to have been involved in leaking further targeting material on Maginn. The RUC did, however, arrest two UDR men involved in the murder. Both men were subsequently convicted of the murder in 1992.

The findings of the Stevens I Investigation

11.80 I am conscious that my finding with respect to the passing of information from members of the security forces to loyalist paramilitaries conflicts with the conclusion reached by the Stevens I Investigation. In the published summary of his May 1990 Report, Sir John Stevens stated that:

"… the passing of information to paramilitaries by members of the Security Forces is restricted to a small number of individuals and is neither widespread nor institutionalised." ^[40]

11.81 Sir John also found that the type of document being leaked to loyalist paramilitaries was restricted to comparatively low-level montage photographs. The summary of the Stevens I Report included the following conclusion:

"It should also be pointed out at this stage that terrorist recognition information documents such as photo montages are classified under the lowest security rating. During the Enquiry no documents of any higher security classification have been recovered, or indeed come to notice, as having been in the hands of any terrorist organisation." ^[41]

11.82 Sir John also suggested that the leaking of montage photographs may have already largely ceased by the time his investigation had begun. His 1990 Report noted that:

"The latest date of any document traced to the possession of Loyalist paramilitaries by the Enquiry is June, 1988." ^[42]

11.83 These three specific conclusions were all highlighted by the Chief Constable Sir Hugh Annesley in his public statement when publishing the summary of the Report on 17 May 1990.^[43]

11.84 However, as I outline in Chapter 24, the obstruction of the Stevens I Investigation meant that Sir John Stevens had been deprived of critical evidence that might have altered his conclusions. Brian Nelson's intelligence dump, for example, had only been handed over in January 1990 and Sir John did not get access to the FRU CFs until October 1990, five months after the publication of the Report's summary. Analysis of the CFs would have quickly shown that the leaking of documents to loyalists had continued well beyond June 1988. The Security Service compendium of intelligence on leaks was sent to the DHSB, Brian Fitzsimons, but he never showed the document to Sir John Stevens.

11.85 In view of this, I wrote to Sir John Stevens during this Review to ask him what his current position was on the question of leaks.^[44] In his reply, Sir John highlighted the fact that documents had initially been withheld from him and noted that this placed him in "an extremely difficult position". He stated that:

"On the basis of all the intelligence gathered by all three enquiries, I do believe from these records that leaks of information [from] the security forces was far more widespread and extensive than expressed in my initial findings." ^[45]

Intelligence assessments of leaks and collusion

11.86 I have considered the assessments made by the Security Service and the FRU with regard to leaks from members of the security forces to loyalist paramilitaries. Consideration of these assessments leads me to believe that both agencies were aware at the time of the scale of the links between the UDA and members of the RUC and the UDR.

11.87 The contemporaneous documentary evidence suggests that both the Security Service and the FRU were concerned that links between the RUC and the UDA could result in their intelligence agents and techniques being exposed to loyalists. John Deverell, the then Director of the Counter-Terrorism FX Branch, highlighted the difficulties of running agents in a memo dated 18 February 1987 regarding the re-recruitment of Brian Nelson:

"It has to be recognised however that [the Security Service's agent-running section] has the main responsibility for independent coverage of the Loyalist target - which is difficult enough in view of RUC susceptibilities." ^[46]

11.88 As a broader contextual point, it is interesting to note that the rationale for establishing independent Security Service coverage of loyalist paramilitaries in 1972 appears to have been based on concerns that the RUC were, at that time, too close to loyalist paramilitaries.^[47] In relation to the late 1980s, there is no doubt that the primacy of the RUC SB - and the consequent obligation on the Security Service and the FRU to share all intelligence with the SB for exploitation - was a cause of concern with respect to the perceived 'susceptibility' of the RUC to leak information to loyalist paramilitaries.

11.89 The FRU certainly held fears with respect to Nelson being unmasked as a result of information being fed to the UDA by RUC officers. In the yearly report produced with regard to Nelson's work as an agent during 1988, the FRU noted that:

"It is a constant worry that information passed by 6137 eventually gets back to the UDA via the RUC. 6137 regularly feels himself under suspicion when this occurs." ^[48]

11.90 This was perhaps justified in the light of events in August 1988, when Nelson was interrogated as a result of the RUC SB feeding information to the UDA suggesting that someone "close" to L/01 was providing information to PIRA.

11.91 In October 1989 the Security Service produced an assessment of collusion between the security forces and loyalists alongside their compendium of leaks. The Security Service assessment was sent to the DCI by the HAG on 3 October 1989. The assessment stated that:

"Despite the limitations of the intelligence, the attached material points clearly to some collusion and some unauthorised passage of information. There is no evidence in the intelligence of any organised conspiracy from within the RUC … the UDR or the Regular Army to provide the paramilitaries with official information on Republican suspects." [Emphasis in original]^[49]

11.92 The assessment went on to consider the origin and nature of the collusion, as follows:

"Intelligence of collusion refers about equally to the UDR and the RUC and there is occasional reference to the Regular and the Territorial Army. Most reports concerning the passing of montages and photographs and also to collusion in supplying the loyalists with SF weapons, involve the UDR or Army as opposed to the RUC. However in references to the passage of general information and to warnings to the paramilitaries of impending security force operations, the RUC predominates." ^[50]

11.93 Privately, the Army adopted a highly adverse attitude towards the RUC's response to this issue. An undated note from the Assistant Chief of Staff of the Intelligence Section (ACOS G2) to the General Officer Commanding (GOC) Northern Ireland suggested that the Chief Constable was likely to be concerned about the potential public exposure of RUC leaks to loyalist paramilitaries. The note stated that:

"FRU consistently reported to the RUC the passage of montages and other Security Force material to the UDA … The Army was not only involved in this activity, but also the RUC." ^[51]

11.94 ACOS G2 went so far as to outline a series of questions posed by the FRU intelligence regarding RUC leaks to loyalists:

"Questions:

a. What was done about this intelligence when it was first received by the RUC Source Unit in Belfast?

b. When was the Stevens team informed about RUC leaks to PPMs? - if so, was this as result [sic] of FRU material.

c. What investigation by Stevens was carried out into all this additional material provided by FRU?

d. Could the Chief Constable weather an investigation into this area? Probably not. Is it FRUs detailed reports that have caused the Chief Constable concern. (The intelligence concerning RUC leaks to PPMs was provided by Nelson. The 'file' is attached for information.)" ^[52]

11.95 These comments are perhaps even more extraordinary in the light of the fact that the 'file' of leaks compiled by the FRU was, in fact, only a small sample of the intelligence provided by Nelson with respect to leaks from the RUC to loyalist paramilitaries.

11.96 Less openly hostile sentiments had already been expressed in Cabinet-level correspondence on this issue. A letter from the Defence Secretary's office to the Attorney General's office dated 28 March 1991 noted that:

"… if it is true that Special Branch were not acting on Nelson's information, one could expect the trial to ventilate the questions of why they ignored threat warnings and reports of leaks." [Emphasis added]^[53]

UK Government Ministers' knowledge of the scale of the leaks

11.97 My Review has established that the security forces were aware of the extent of leaks of information to loyalist paramilitaries. The scale of the leaks was such that it could have potentially had public policy implications. The leaks were undoubtedly so serious in their nature that Government Ministers should have received regular briefings on the issue.

11.98 However, my analysis of the briefing of UK Government Ministers by the intelligence agencies suggests that Ministers were, in fact, given very little indication of the scale of the problem. Security Service records demonstrate that a small number of intelligence reports highlighting leaks from members of the security forces to the UDA were disseminated to Ministers around the time of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland during the period from September 1984 to September 1985, Douglas Hurd MP, received at least two intelligence reports linking UDR and RUC officers respectively to the UDA during this period.^[54]

11.99 Tom King MP, who served as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland from September 1985 to July 1989, received a report linking the members of the Ulster Clubs to the security forces, and the more general intelligence in the spring of 1986 (quoted at paragraph 11.23) which indicated that the flow of information from members of the security forces to the UDA had increased since the Anglo-Irish Agreement.^[55]

11.100 However, thereafter I have been unable to find any evidence of Ministers being provided with significant intelligence briefing on the matter of leaks from members of the security forces to loyalist paramilitaries. There is no record to indicate why reporting to Ministers might have diminished, though it is possible that the overall success of the security forces, and particularly the RUC, in withstanding loyalist mobilisation against the Anglo-Irish Agreement meant that the issue was viewed with less concern by the intelligence agencies.

11.101 In his written statement to my Review, Security Service officer G/07 stated that:

"No records have been identified which indicate whether or not Ministers were briefed by the Security Service on 'leaks' from RUC/UDR/Army to loyalist paramilitaries." ^[56]

11.102 My analysis of the briefing provided at the outset of the Stevens I Investigation suggests that Ministers were essentially unaware of the scale of leaks from members of the security forces to loyalist paramilitaries. The key briefing in this respect was the Security Policy Meeting (SPM) that took place on 26 September 1989. This SPM was attended by the Secretary of State, the Chief Constable, the GOC, the DCI and others.

11.103 Prior to the SPM, the GOC, General Sir John Waters, wrote to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland outlining the Army's position on security reforms being sought by the Irish Government. In his letter dated 24 September, Gen Waters included the following comment on the issue of leaks to loyalist paramilitaries:

"The next area, 'leaks', has attracted the most media attention but has at its roots faulty perceptions. I of course am not minimising the harm that these montages can do in the wrong hands, nor indeed condoning their illegal dissemination. However I think that the correct perspectives should be applied. Firstly there is no question that 'information' leaks per se are under scrutiny. The problem has been confined to leaked or stolen photographs." [Emphasis in original]^[57]

11.104 Gen Waters emphasised again that the issue of leaks related to montage photographs rather than any wider transmission of 'information'. He informed the Secretary of State that:

"In essence we are, with MoD and the RUC, getting on positively with the control of recognition aids - but I am still nervous about the word 'information' which, if mischievously broadened, could be a running sore unless confined to the area of recognition aids. I hope that you agree." ^[58]

11.105 The minutes of the SPM dated 26 September suggest a similar line being pursued by the Chief Constable. The Chief Constable was recorded as having told the Secretary of State that:

"The [Stevens] inquiry was presently focusing entirely on members of 7/10 UDR and the signs were that no other parts of the Army or the RUC or other agencies were directly implicated." [Emphasis in original]^[59]

11.106 In fairness, it should be noted that the SPM did discuss measures designed to prevent leaks. Nevertheless, the GOC's recorded comments tended to emphasise the limited nature of the problem of leaks to loyalist paramilitaries. He stated that the leaks related to comparatively low-level terrorist 'recognition aids' and that:

"There was no evidence that 'security' material (and certainly not security files) had gone missing." ^[60]

11.107 Any analysis of Brian Nelson's intelligence material or the Security Service's papers on leaks would have quickly demonstrated that loyalists certainly had gained access on occasions to some high-level 'security material'.

11.108 I have sought to establish whether the Security Service subsequently briefed Ministers on the leaks detailed in the compendium produced by the Assessments Group. An internal memo from the DCI to the London office noted that the purpose of compiling the compendium of leaks was to:

"… arm ourselves in case the NIO [Northern Ireland Office] ask us for briefing on what we know of the scale and nature of the problem." ^[61]

11.109 However, the Security Service has confirmed to my Review that there is no record of this briefing having been shared with the Northern Ireland Office. In the absence of such briefing, Ministers would have had little means by which to question the information they were receiving from senior Army and RUC officers suggesting that the problem was low level and confined to a specific branch of the UDR.

Overview

11.110 The scale and nature of the 'leaks' from members of the security forces to loyalist paramilitaries during the late 1980s has never properly been acknowledged. The leaks of information certainly involved much contact between junior UDR and RUC officers and members of the UDA. However, there is evidence to suggest that the leaks could also originate from comparatively senior officers and, on occasions, relate to sensitive intelligence information.

11.111 The Security Service made a detailed assessment in 1985 that 85% of the UDA's intelligence came from the security forces. Having examined a very large volume of material relating to UDA activity in the late 1980s, I am satisfied that the proportion of their intelligence originating from the security forces would have remained largely unchanged by February 1989. I have no doubt that the UDA were heavily reliant on RUC and UDR leaks to carry out its targeting and attacks during this period.

11.112 The nature of these findings should not be held to impugn the reputation of the majority of those who served in the RUC and the UDR to uphold the rule of the law in extraordinarily difficult circumstances. Nevertheless, although only a minority of officers engaged in such activity, the leaks can only be described as widespread in their extent.

11.113 I am satisfied that leaks to loyalist paramilitaries were not institutional in the sense that there was an official or unofficial policy or strategy to authorise the provision of information to such groups. However, there was certainly an institutional failure on the part of the RUC and the UDR to take the necessary action to tackle the issue of leaks prior to the Stevens I Investigation. Both the RUC SB and Army intelligence were fully aware of the extent of leaks, but the action taken to combat such leaks was, in my view, inadequate in view of the scale of the problem.