Chechnya
A Tale of Two Theaters: Russian Actions in Chechnya in 1994 and 1999 - Timothy Thomas. Analysis of Current Events article, September 2000. Between 1994 and 1996, Russia fought a war to prevent its semi-autonomous republic of Chechnya from breaking away. The Chechens theoretically “won” the war. Chechnya was permitted de facto independence, even though Russian President Boris Yeltsin managed to put off a final agreement on Chechnya’s status until the year 2001. However, Russia’s armed forces never admitted defeat, and began planning operations and conducting training to retake Chechnya almost immediately. Between 1996 and the spring of 1999, events created another opportunity to intervene in Chechnya. These included widespread Chechen hostage-taking, car and cattle theft, and illegal tapping of oil pipelines passing through Chechnya. The Chechen incursion into Dagestan in August 1999, and the suspected Chechen bombing of Russian apartment buildings in the fall of 1999, gave the Russian government the final pretext to conduct the second intervention in Chechnya, in October 1999.
Chechen Nationalism and the Tragedy of the Struggle for Independence - Lester Grau and Dr. Jacob Kipp. National Strategy Forum Review article, Autumn 2000. The conflict in Chechnya has attracted world attention. The Chechens are a nation in a region of many nations. Moscow views Chechen independence as a geopolitical “domino” threatening Russia’s disintegration. Chechens call for national self-determination and Islamic revival. The conflict pits the warriors of a small but proud and warlike nation against the regular troops and paramilitary formations of a great state struggling to redefine itself after seven decades of Communism. At the heart of the struggle remain Russia’s relations with those nations brought into the tsarist empire by force and subjected to totalitarian repression. Hostilities continue as the Chechens cannot expel the Russians and the Russians cannot prevent Chechen raids and terrorist actions. Following a long tradition, the Russian government has defined the conflict as a struggle against banditry and terrorism—much as it did in Central Asia in the 1920s and early 1930s, and in Afghanistan in the late 1970s and 1980s. This legitimizes Russia’s course of actions, however ruthless the means, as a police function in the name of public order. The Chechens, meanwhile, refer to their war as a “struggle for national and political liberation” and an Islamic holy war, or jihad. Neither side sees the conflict as a civil war. Russia will not honor the Chechens with that political legitimacy, and Chechens refuse to accept the idea that they were ever voluntarily a part of the Russian Empire, Soviet state, or Russian Federation. This struggle is a manifestation of what Samuel Huntington described as a “clash of civilizations.” Like other such conflicts it has its roots in the history of the interactions between the protagonists. Chechens have embraced an Islamic revival to foster internal solidarity and to mobilize a broader struggle across the region. The region itself defines the clash.
Russia's Chechen Wars 1994 - 2000: Lessons from Urban Combat - Olga Oliker. Rand study, 2001.An examination of the difficulties faced by the Russian military in planning and carrying out urban operations in Chechnya. Russian and rebel military forces fought to control the Chechen city of Grozny in the winters of 1994-1995 and 1999-2000, as well as clashing in smaller towns and villages. The author examines both Russian and rebel tactics and operations in those battles, focusing on how and why the combatants' approaches changed over time.
Urban Warfare Study: City Case Studies Compilation - Marine Corps Intelligence Activity study, 1999. In 1997, in light of the probability of future operations in urban environments, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) was tasked to provide a preliminary assessment of urban warfare lessons learned in support of the CSEEA Joint Wargame. Three scenarios across the spectrum of conflict from mid- to low-intensity were chosen to represent urban operations. The lessons are drawn from Russian operations in Chechnya, Israeli operations in Lebanon and British operations in Northern Ireland. This study presents strategic, operational, tactical and technical lessons learned from each of those operations.
View From the Wolves' Den - The Chechens and Urban Operations - David Dilegge. Small Wars and Insurgencies article, 2001. In 1998, the United States Marine Corps was presented with an opportunity to conduct interviews with Chechen commanders and key staff officers who participated in combat operations against Russian forces in the 1994-1996 conflict. The Corps was particularly interested in obtaining the Chechen view as it was then conducting a series of experiments (Urban Warrior) designed to improve its capability to conduct urban operations. Having studied the horrendous losses the Russians experienced during its first incursion into Grozny, and faced with the dilemma of finding solutions to the high casualty rate inherent to the city fight, the Marines thought it prudent to gain the perspective of those who had planned and conducted an urban insurgency against a modern conventional force.
David Slays Goliath: A Chechen Perspective on the War in Chechnya (1994 - 1996) - Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Jackson, USMC. Marine Corps Wargaming Division paper, 2000. On 11 December 1994, 40,000 troops of the Russian Army attacked into the breakaway republic of Chechnya, with the intent of removing Chechen separatist leader, Jokhar Dudayev, and replacing his government with one more favorable to Moscow. Two years later, the last units of the Russian force withdrew from Chechnya, culminating two years of humiliation at the hands of a much smaller and far more modestly equipped foe.
General-Major Tourpal-Ali Kaimov - On Urban Warfare in Chechnya - David Dilegge. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity paper, 2000. In 1998, the United States Marine Corps was presented with an opportunity to conduct interviews with Chechen commanders and key staff officers who participated in combat operations against Russian forces in the 1994-1996 conflict. The Corps was particularly interested in obtaining the Chechen view as it was then conducting a series of experiments (Urban Warrior) designed to improve its capability to conduct urban operations. Having studied the horrendous losses the Russians experienced during its first incursion into Grozny, and faced with the dilemma of finding solutions to the high casualty rate inherent to the city fight, the Marines thought it prudent to gain the perspective of those who had planned and conducted an urban insurgency against a modern conventional force.
Interview: Aslan Maskhadov - US Marine Corps interview conducted by Ms. Marie Broxup. June 1999 interview conducted in Chechnya. The link provides the raw - unedited interview as presented to David Dilegge (Project Manger) as part of the Marines' desire to gain the perspective of those who had planned and conducted an urban insurgency against a modern conventional force.
Interview: Suleiman Bustaev - US Marine Corps interview conducted by Ms. Marie Broxup. June 1999 interview conducted in Chechnya. The link provides the raw - unedited interview as presented to David Dilegge (Project Manger) as part of the Marines' desire to gain the perspective of those who had planned and conducted an urban insurgency against a modern conventional force.
Interview: Dalkhan Khozhev - US Marine Corps interview conducted by Ms. Marie Broxup. June 1999 interview conducted in Chechnya. The link provides the raw - unedited interview as presented to David Dilegge (Project Manger) as part of the Marines' desire to gain the perspective of those who had planned and conducted an urban insurgency against a modern conventional force.
Interview: Aydemir Abalaev - US Marine Corps interview conducted by Ms. Marie Broxup. June 1999 interview conducted in Chechnya. The link provides the raw - unedited interview as presented to David Dilegge (Project Manger) as part of the Marines' desire to gain the perspective of those who had planned and conducted an urban insurgency against a modern conventional force.
Interview: Ahmad Zakaev - US Marine Corps interview conducted by Ms. Marie Broxup. June 1999 interview conducted in Chechnya. The link provides the raw - unedited interview as presented to David Dilegge (Project Manger) as part of the Marines' desire to gain the perspective of those who had planned and conducted an urban insurgency against a modern conventional force.
Interview: Ali Demaev - US Marine Corps interview conducted by Ms. Marie Broxup. June 1999 interview conducted in Chechnya. The link provides the raw - unedited interview as presented to David Dilegge (Project Manger) as part of the Marines' desire to gain the perspective of those who had planned and conducted an urban insurgency against a modern conventional force.
Interview: Ali Atgireyev - US Marine Corps interview conducted by Ms. Marie Broxup. June 1999 interview conducted in Chechnya. The link provides the raw - unedited interview as presented to David Dilegge (Project Manger) as part of the Marines' desire to gain the perspective of those who had planned and conducted an urban insurgency against a modern conventional force.
Interview: Apty Batalov - US Marine Corps interview conducted by Ms. Marie Broxup. June 1999 interview conducted in Chechnya. The link provides the raw - unedited interview as presented to David Dilegge (Project Manger) as part of the Marines' desire to gain the perspective of those who had planned and conducted an urban insurgency against a modern conventional force.
Interview: Ruslan Alikhadzhiev - US Marine Corps interview conducted by Ms. Marie Broxup. June 1999 interview conducted in Chechnya. The link provides the raw - unedited interview as presented to David Dilegge (Project Manger) as part of the Marines' desire to gain the perspective of those who had planned and conducted an urban insurgency against a modern conventional force.
Interview: Husein Iskhanov - US Marine Corps interview conducted by Ms. Marie Broxup. June 1999 interview conducted in Chechnya. The link provides the raw - unedited interview as presented to David Dilegge (Project Manger) as part of the Marines' desire to gain the perspective of those who had planned and conducted an urban insurgency against a modern conventional force.
Interview: Hamid Iangulbaev - US Marine Corps interview conducted by Ms. Marie Broxup. June 1999 interview conducted in Chechnya. The link provides the raw - unedited interview as presented to David Dilegge (Project Manger) as part of the Marines' desire to gain the perspective of those who had planned and conducted an urban insurgency against a modern conventional force.
Interview: Ilyas Akhmadov - US Marine Corps interview conducted by Ms. Marie Broxup. June 1999 interview conducted in Chechnya. The link provides the raw - unedited interview as presented to David Dilegge (Project Manger) as part of the Marines' desire to gain the perspective of those who had planned and conducted an urban insurgency against a modern conventional force.
Interview: Magomed Khambiev - US Marine Corps interview conducted by Ms. Marie Broxup. June 1999 interview conducted in Chechnya. The link provides the raw - unedited interview as presented to David Dilegge (Project Manger) as part of the Marines' desire to gain the perspective of those who had planned and conducted an urban insurgency against a modern conventional force.
Interview: Payzullah Nutsulkhanov - US Marine Corps interview conducted by Ms. Marie Broxup. June 1999 interview conducted in Chechnya. The link provides the raw - unedited interview as presented to David Dilegge (Project Manger) as part of the Marines' desire to gain the perspective of those who had planned and conducted an urban insurgency against a modern conventional force.
Interview: Said Iskhanov - US Marine Corps interview conducted by Ms. Marie Broxup. June 1999 interview conducted in Chechnya. The link provides the raw - unedited interview as presented to David Dilegge (Project Manger) as part of the Marines' desire to gain the perspective of those who had planned and conducted an urban insurgency against a modern conventional force.
Interview: Said Iskhanov (Part 2) - US Marine Corps interview conducted by Ms. Marie Broxup. June 1999 interview conducted in Chechnya. The link provides the raw - unedited interview as presented to David Dilegge (Project Manger) as part of the Marines' desire to gain the perspective of those who had planned and conducted an urban insurgency against a modern conventional force.
A Face of Future Battle: Chechen Fighter Shamil Basayev - Major Raymond Finch, III, USA. Military Review article, June-July 1997. As the 20th Century draws to a close, military theorists and planners, in and out of uniform, are considering the implications that changes in the global security environment have for future conflict and war. The certainties of the Cold War have been replaced by a number of indeterminate, indistinct threats. As Desert Storm proved, the US military remains prepared to defeat large conventional forces, but is it ready to tackle those obscure dangers looming on the horizon? Consider the recent comments of the Marine Corps Commandant: "future war is most likely not the son of Desert Storm; rather it will be the stepchild of Somalia and Chechnya". In Somalia, despite overwhelming superiority in firepower and technology, a group of lightly-armed "rebels" effectively forced the US military out of the country by inflicting casualties on an elite unit.
Tactical Observations from the Grozny Combat Experience - Major Brett Jenkinson, USA. US Army Command and General Staff College thesis, 2002. The Russian battles for Grozny, Chechnya provide relevant contemporary examples for the study of urban combat involving modern, conventional forces on one side and a guerrilla force on the other. The first and fourth battles for Grozny, a city of nearly a half million people, were the major Russian assaults to seize the city from the Chechens during the latter’s struggle for secession from the Russian Federation. This thesis provides an explanation of the historical method used, a history of the Chechen-Russian relations leading to the battles, a description of the first and fourth battles, their lessons learned, and an analysis of the value of those lessons learned. This thesis provides a frame of reference for future urban combat and highlights valuable techniques to improve urban combat military theory.
Grozny 2000: Urban Combat Lessons Learned - Timothy Thomas. Military Review article, July-August 2000. Today, Grozny is no more. The contrast between the damaged Grozny before the latest battle and the utter destruction afterwards could not be more pronounced. The literal leveling of the city points to lessons that the Russian Armed Forces learned from their earlier battles for Grozny. The January 2000 battle was the second major battle for Grozny in five years along with two minor battles in 1996. In fall 1994 Grozny was the scene of fighting between opposing Chechen forces, those of President Djokhar Dudayev versus the Dudayev opposition, which received covert support from President Boris Yeltsin's government in Moscow. In late November, the opposition attacked Grozny with a few tanks and armored vehicles and was quickly annihilated. A month later, the first major battle for Grozny took place. It involved Russia's armed forces and turned the city into a bloody battleground before the Russians drove Dudayev's forces from the city. In August 1996 the Chechens retook the city. In late 1999 and early 2000, after a very well planned advance to the Terek River, Russian forces again assaulted Grozny—this time with artillery fire and air power instead of tanks and infantry—turning the city into rubble. This battle for Grozny proved different from the infamous January 1995 battle in both the attackers' strategy and tactics. This article examines what lessons the Russian army learned from the 1995 battle for Grozny and applied to the January 2000 battle. It also examines what lessons the Russian army either failed to learn or chose not to apply.
Russian Lessons Learned From the Battles For Grozny - Lester Grau and Timothy Thomas. Marine Corps Gazette article, April 2000. Two years ago, Mr. Thomas gave a conference briefing on the Russian lessons learned from the first battle for Grozny (January 1995). Apparently, a conference participant put his notes of the briefing on the Internet and these notes have enjoyed a long run. However, some of the notes were slightly exaggerated from the original presentation. With the third battle of Grozny just concluded (second battle was August 1996, third battle January 2000), The Marine Corps Gazette decided to reprint the original lessons learned with minor adjustments from Mr. Thomas, and add FMSO's Russian lessons learned from their subsequent battles for Grozny. The latter represents the joint work of Mr. Thomas and Mr. Grau.
The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat - Timothy Thomas. Parameters article, Summer 1999. The battle for Grozny, the capital of the small Russian Republic of Chechnya, took place in January 1995. It pitted a hastily assembled and unprepared Russian force against a Chechen force of regulars and guerrillas equipped with Russian weapons and a belief in their cause. The Chechens held their own for three weeks but eventually lost the city to the Russian armed forces in late January (the Chechens retook the city in August 1996). Both sides learned or relearned many lessons of urban combat, most of them the hard way. This article examines the most important of those lessons, the interesting and perhaps surprising conclusions drawn by the Russians about modern urban warfare, and their implications for US soldiers and urban warfare theory.
Changing Russian Urban Tactics: The Aftermath of the Battle for Grozny - Lester Grau. INSS Strategic Forum article, July 1995. Combat in cities is not an easy option for any army and makes inordinate demands on logistics and available manpower. Soviet urban tactics were designed to complement large-scale high-tempo offensive operations on the territory of a foreign country. Undefended enemy cities would be captured from the march. Defended cities would be bypassed. The enemy was a foreign professional soldier who had no desire to participate in the destruction of his own cities and would prefer declaring an open city instead of seeing it reduced to rubble. Today's political and military reality no longer fit the underlying Soviet assumptions of urban combat. Now, irregular forces, whose political agenda is strengthened by the destruction of cities, fight Russian forces on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Recent fighting for Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, led to the revision of Russian urban tactics. While the initial Russian attack was a debacle, the Russian Army pulled itself together and eventually captured the city. Since then, the Russian Army has been slowly improving on its performance, refitting its forces and concentrating on finishing the fight. Since much went wrong, the Russians are studying the lessons from that combat and updating their urban tactics.
Lessons Learned from the Battle of Grozny, 1994-1995 - Cadet Sean McCafferty. US Military Academy paper, May 2000. Historically, MOUT has always been the bloodiest type of battle, from the Peloponnesian War over two thousand years ago to the first Battle of Grozny, only five years ago. MOUT is not a mission, nor is it simply a type of terrain. Instead, MOUT is an entirely different environment. Military Operations in Urban Terrain are going to be unavoidable in the future: the world’s cities are going to be the battleground. First, cities are naturally strategically key terrain. Cities are usually the economic, political, and psychological centers of gravity of states. Cities are where the nation keeps its treasured possessions, museums, banks, and businesses.
Echoes of Chechnya Warfare Resound in Moscow, Quantico - Robert Ackerman. Link to Signal Magazine article, 2000. Several months of Russian attacks have shifted the balance of power in Chechnya and changed U.S. thinking about urban warfare. After suffering stunning public defeats just a few years ago, Russian forces applied painful lessons learned then to drive Chechen forces out of their capital city, Grozny, this year. Yet, according to U.S. analysts, this may have merely altered the thrust of battle, not resolved it. And, the tactics employed by both sides are forcing U.S. experts to take another look at the concept of urban warfare.
Wounded Bear: The Ongoing Russian Military Operation in Chechnya - Major Gregory Celestan, USA. US Army Foreign Military Studies Office paper, August 1996. On December 11, 1994, units from the Russian Ground Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs entered Chechnya to restore Russian sovereignty and to thwart the proclaimed independence of Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev. A year and a half later, despite their combat experience and numerical superiority, the Russian Armed Forces still have not crushed the Chechen fighters. The Russian military experience in Chechnya, however, is not unique. During the Cold War, the Soviet Army fought for nine years in Afghanistan without achieving military victory over the Mujahideen resistance. With the end of the Cold War, regional conflicts are becoming more common and other armies are finding themselves fighting local conflicts under similar circumstances. The Russian experience should serve as a lesson for all military organizations on the folly of committing inadequately-trained and equipped troops to battle. While this type of operation would have been difficult for any army, the Russian performance has been especially poor. Learning from the problems and mistakes of the Russian Armed Forces can help other militaries avoid these same pitfalls on a future battlefield
Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and the Paradoxes of Asymmetric Conflict - Major Robert Cassidy, USA. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, February 2003. Asymmetric warfare poses some of the most pressing and complex challenges faced by the United States today. As American defense leaders and strategic thinkers adapt to this era of asymmetry, it is important that we learn both from our own experience and from that of other nations which have faced asymmetric enemies. In this monograph, Major Robert Cassidy uses a detailed assessment of the Russian experience in Afghanistan and Chechnya to draw important conclusions about asymmetric warfare. He then uses this to provide recommendations for the U.S. military, particularly the Army. Major Cassidy points out that small wars are difficult for every great power, yet are the most common kind. Even in this era of asymmetry, the U.S. Army exhibits a cultural preference for the “big war” paradigm. He suggests that the U.S. military in general, including the Army, needs a cultural transformation to master the challenge of asymmetry fully. From this will grow doctrine and organizational change.
The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security: the Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya Part I: From Intervention to the Outskirts of Grozny - Timothy Thomas. Journal of Slavic Military Studies article, June 1995. This article is based on open source literature published in the Russian press, and items broadcast on Russian radio and TV. Most, but not all, of the reports are from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). During the intervention, Russian government and Chechen sources accused one another of placing disinformation in the press. This effort does not aim to prove one point of view correct. It's aim is merely to provide a framework and some logic for the events that have occurred and their consequences.
The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security: the Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya Part II: Military Activities of the Conflict During 11-31 December 1994 - Timothy Thomas. Journal of Slavic Military Studies article, June 1995. This article is based on open source literature published in the Russian press, and items broadcast on Russian radio and TV. Most, but not all, of the reports are from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). During the intervention, Russian government and Chechen sources accused one another of placing disinformation in the press. This effort does not aim to prove one point of view correct. It's aim is merely to provide a framework and some logic for the events that have occurred and their consequences.
The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security: The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya Part III. The Battle for Grozny, 1-26 January 1995 - Timothy Thomas. Journal of Slavic Military Studies article, March 1997. This article provides an overview of the fighting in and around Grozny from 1 to 26 January 1995. It also addresses issues associated with lessons learned by the Russian armed forces and internal affairs troops during the course of the fighting in Grozny. This is a Russian perception filtered through an American analyst. It does not attempt to present the fighting from a Chechen point of view. Hopefully, there will be a time in the future when this analysis can be performed as well.
Air Operations in Low Intensity Conflict: The Case of Chechnya - Timothy Thomas. Airpower Journal article, Winter 1997. Recent conflicts in Chechnya and Bosnia indicate that for the immediate future, low intensity conflicts (LIC) will predominate over high-intensity Operation Desert Storm–type scenarios. The sober reality is that these skirmishes, according to Gen Charles Boyd, US Air Force, Retired, “cannot produce an enduring solution with military force—air or ground—only one that will last until it departs” and that “a reliance on air power alone—the strike option—in this type of terrain with these kinds of targets has never held any real promise of conflict resolution." Boyd’s comments appear to hold for the conflict from December 1994 to August 1996 between Russian and Chechen rebel forces. Here, one of the combatants was a former superpower and the other a loose collection of rebels armed only with ground weapons. Against no credible air threat other than antiquated ZSU-23/4 air defense artillery, the Russian air force, while effective, was unable to make a major impact on the course and outcome of the fighting.
A 'Crushing' Victory: Fuel-Air Explosives and Grozny 2000 - Lester Grau. Marine Corps Gazette article, August 2000. Following a deliberate advance across the northern Chechen plains in October through December 1999, the Russian Army closed on the Chechen capital city of Grozny and the foothills of the imposing Caucasus mountains. There, the advance stopped. The Russians began the new century with a renewed assault on Grozny. The Russians continued their deliberate urban advance and, after forty days of fighting, the smoking ruins of Grozny were theirs. Unlike the first battle for Grozny (in late 1994-early 1995) or the recapture of the city by the Chechens (in 1996), the Russians now used quantities of fuel-air weapons, along with iron bombs, surface-to-surface missiles with high-explosive warheads, massed artillery and tank fire. These flattened large sections of the city and crushed the opposing force.
Urban Warfare Communications: A Contemporary Russian View - Lester Grau. Red Thrust Star article, July 1996. Russian combat experience in urban warfare includes World War II, fighting in Budapest during the 1956 Hungarian revolution, and fighting in Herat and Kandahar during the 1979-1989 Soviet-Afghan War. In December 1994, the Russian Army entered the breakaway Republic of Chechnya and attempted to capture the capital city of Grozny from the march. After this attempt failed, the Russian Army spent two months in deliberate house-to-house fighting before they finally captured the city. Fighting still occurs sporadically in Grozny. During the battle for Grozny, Russian forces experienced difficulty in communicating within the city. Russian ground forces, like other ground forces, did not train for communicating on urban terrain in their training centers, since the training centers are never big enough to replicate the special communication problems of a city. Furthermore, they did not replicate the need for units to share identical frequencies in urban combat. Additionally, their unit training emphasized the use of FM and UHF radio, whereas the modern urban landscape already contains cellular phones, computer nets, fiber optic cable and other modern communications systems. Once a fighting force enters a city, communications pose distinct problems. The force fragments and loses sight of flanking elements. Radios often don't work or work sporadically. If the civilian telephone system is inoperable, senior commanders may initially be unable to control the battle. In this case, the battle quickly becomes a platoon leader's fight. The Russian Army is conducting a self-appraisal of its on-going performance in the fighting in Chechnya. Russian military theoreticians are paying close attention to the conduct of urban combat.
“Soft Log” and Concrete Canyons: Russian Urban Combat Logistics in Grozny - Lester Grau and Timothy Thomas. Marine Corps Gasette article, October 1999. Although logistics is a major concern of warfare, comparatively little has been written about logistics when compared to writings about the tactical and strategic aspects of various wars. As a subset, very little has been written about logistical support of urban combat. One historic precept of urban combat logistics is that ammunition expenditure increases dramatically when fighting in cities. Recent Russian experience in fighting for the Chechen capital city of Grozny in January/February 1995 demonstrated that ammunition resupply was not the only problem. Demands on maintenance, supply, transport and medical support surpassed the capabilities of TO&E logistics units. Logistics demands were further increased by the requirement to provide humanitarian relief during the course of the fighting. Russian tactics, techniques and operational concepts for urban combat were based on their broad experience in the Great Patriotic War [World War II]. There were three underlying assumptions that shaped the Soviet/Russian concept of future urban combat. First, urban combat would be fought in nearly "empty" foreign cities where the bulk of the local civilian populace had left. Second, that the enemy force in the city would be a conventional military force. Third, that the army would have a period of conventional combat to fully develop procedures and identify problems before it began that most-difficult mission-- fighting in a city. None of these assumptions proved correct in the fighting in Grozny. The civilians had no place to go and did not expect such extreme fighting, so they sat tight while the fighting engulfed the city. The Russian Army, as the sole government representative, was expected to provide food, shelter, clean water, sewage, electricity, and medical treatment to the civilians (who were citizens of the Russian Federation). The Russian TO&E combat service support units were barely able to sustain the Russian Army, let alone the large civilian populace, due to the increased demands of urban combat. It was beyond their capability and the civilians suffered. Eventually, the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM) helped restore these facilities.
Handling the Wounded in a Counter-Guerrilla War: the Soviet/Russian Experience in Afghanistan and Chechnya - Lester Grau and Dr. William Jorgensen. Military Review article, July-August 2000. The Soviet Union intervened in the Afghanistan Civil War on Christmas Day 1979 to restore a weak and faltering communist government that was rapidly slipping out of control. The Soviets expected little resistance and apparently had no plan for staying longer than three years. They were there for nine years, one month and eighteen days. Soviet Army medical personnel were also there for the duration fighting disease and wounds. While they were there, they improved casualty-handling and surgical support. Consequently, during the latter part of the war, they saved many lives that would have been lost earlier. They applied many of these lessons to the war in the break-away Republic of Chechnya. Many of their lessons learned can be applied to other modern forces fighting on rugged and urban terrain.
Combat Stress in Chechnya: "The Equal Opportunity Disorder" - Timothy Thomas and Major Charles O'Hara (USA). Army Medical Department Journal article, January-March 2000. Russia's conflict with Chechnya, a republic in the southwestern part of the Russian Federation, lasted from Dec 94 to Aug 96. Like the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the Chechen conflict produced severe cases of combat stress and psychological trauma. Unlike the war in Afghanistan, where most of the fighting was conducted in valleys or in the mountains, the fighting in Chechnya was conducted in cities or at close range in the countryside. As one Russian officer noted about the latter conflict - The majority of analysts have arrived at the opinion that the course and outcome of modern war in large part will depend on the psychological condition of servicemen, their ability to endure an ever-increasing (psychological) load, overcome fear in battle, and preserve their will to win.
Information Warfare in the Second (1999-Present) Chechen War: Motivator for Military Reform? - Timothy Thomas. Russian Military Reform 1992-2002 article, 2003. During the past ten years, the Russian military has attentively studied the subject of information war (IW). The main catalyst for this interest was the successful use of IW by coalition forces during Operation Desert Storm. Russian military theorists watched coalition planes bomb Iraqi targets in real time with precision and understood that warfare had entered a new phase, one dominated by information-based equipment and resources. Two further motivators were the poor use of IW by the Russian armed forces during the first Russian-Chechen war (1994-1996), which contributed to the loss of Russian morale, and the successful use of IW by NATO during the conflict over Kosovo. The success of the coalition forces in both Desert Storm and Kosovo indicated that military reform would be bankrupt if the technical aspect of reform did not include information-based technologies. These technologies must be imbedded into new military equipment, from sensors and radars to jet fighters and cruise missiles. However, Russia was also concerned about the impact of information technologies on the brain and consequently morale. These technologies included the rapid distribution of information via the mass media and Internet. Military reform would also have to take this element into consideration.
Manipulating The Mass Consciousness: Russian And Chechen "Information War" Tactics In The 2nd Chechen-Russian Conflict - Timothy Thomas. US Army Foreign Military Studies Office paper, 2001. How important is public opinion to the overall success of a military operation? In the information age, as Russians and Chechens clearly demonstrated, it is "more important than ever." Live feeds from all corners of the globe shape an audience's understanding of events. These digital images spawn a virtual battlefield on which the actions of soldiers and sergeants acquire strategic significance, especially when presented and explained by TV reporters who lack a military background. This makes media control of sensitive military-political situations a crucial though difficult proposition. In addition the Internet can circumvent media control by reporting directly from battle zones with no intervening media filter. The Internet can also shape images and build public and financial support. The end result is an "information war" in the true sense of the word. This chapter discusses the battle for public opinion, the "information war," during the second Chechen campaign. The discussion has a Russian, Chechen, and foreign news context, and includes the evolving Internet battle between Russia and Chechnya. Initially, the Russians were successful in capturing public opinion. Their information victory changed public support for the conflict almost overnight. For example, in May 1999 President Boris Yeltsin was almost impeached for his decision to intervene in Chechnya in 1994. By October of 1999, with the press under control, Yeltsin gathered widespread support for the second intervention, and raised the popularity of then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. But as the war drags on into the summer of 2000, Russia may be neutralizing its own achievements by promising victory too many times. Sustaining the rosy picture that all will end well has become a very difficult proposition.
The Second Chechen War: The Information Component - Emil Pain. Military Review article, July-August 2000. In December 1994 Russian authorities made their first attempt to crush Chechen separatism militarily. However, after two years of bloody combat the Russian army was forced to withdraw from the Chechen Republic. The obstinacy of the Russian authorities who had decided on a policy of victory in Chechnya resulted in the deaths of at least 30,000 Chechens and 5,000 Russian soldiers. This war, which caused an estimated $5.5 billion in economic damage, was largely the cause of Russia's national economic crisis in 1998, when the Russian government proved unable to service its huge debts. It seemed that after the 1994-1996 war Russian society and the federal government realized the ineffectiveness of using colonial approaches to resolve ethnopolitical issues. They also understood, it seemed, the impossibility of forcibly imposing their will upon even a small ethnoterritorial community if a significant portion of that community is prepared to take up arms to defend its interests. Aslan Maskhadov was recently elected president of the Chechen Republic and has been so recognized by Russian officials. In 1997, when Maskhadov visited Moscow to sign a treaty, both he and President Boris Yeltsin signed an agreement obligating both sides to resolve peacefully all contentious issues arising between the Federation and the Chechen Republic. Just a few months before the second war, Russian Prime Minister Sergey Stepashin stated that federal troops would not be sent into Chechnya, which most experts believed. However, in August 1999 President Yeltsin removed Stepashin from his post and named Vladimir Putin as his replacement. In October combat actions began anew in Chechnya. Russian authorities called these actions "operations to suppress terrorism," while journalists christened them the "second Chechen war."